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Abstract
THE IMPACT OF TRIAL CONSULTANTS ON PERCEPTIONS OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE AND JUROR VERDICTS: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
by
Jennifer B. Katz

Adviser: Professor Harold Goldstein

Despite the proliferation of the trial consulting industry in recent years, we know virtually
nothing about the impact that the use of a trial consultant may have on a jury. This
laboratory study seeks to fill some of the gaps in the trial consulting literature by using
the principles of procedural justice to explore what, if any, impact the use of a trial
consultant can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial, as well as the possibility that
perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship between the balance of trial consultants
and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous. Two hundred fifty-five
jury-eligible individuals recruited from the participant pool of the psychology and
management departments at Baruch College were asked to complete three questionnaires
following the random assignment to a case summary that had been manipulated with
respect to evidence strength (SOE) and use of a trial consultant. Hypotheses predicted
that (a) a trial would be perceived as being higher in neutrality and global fairness if both
the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant than if only one party used a trial
consultant, (b) the likelihood of conviction would be highest when the evidence favored
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the prosecution, moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the
evidence favored the defense, (c) the likelihood of conviction would be impacted by an
interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants such that when the evidence is
ambiguous and both sides use a trial consultant, the likelihood of conviction would be
higher than when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant but lower than when the
defendant alone used a trial consultant, and (d) the relationship between the balance of
trial consultants and likelihood of conviction would be mediated by perceptions of
neutrality and global fairness when the evidence was ambiguous. Results supported the
hypothesized relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction, but there was only
weak to moderate support for the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and
perceptions of fairness. No significant interaction or mediation was found among the
variables. Implications for the fields of procedural justice and trial consulting are
discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Although the trial consulting industry has been in existence for almost four
decades and the publication of jury selection guides by attorneys for use by other
attorneys dates back more than 100 years (Fulero & Penrod, 1990), the widespread
acceptance of trial consultants by many in the legal community is a relatively new
phenomenon (“Giving Lawyers,” 2002). Lawyers are increasingly realizing that trial
consultants are no longer frivolous luxuries to be used only in highly publicized cases,
but rather people who can give invaluable feedback and guidance from the standpoint of
someone trained to think more like a juror than a lawyer (Bennett & Hirschhorn, 1993).
Trial consultants are often called upon to assist attorneys in all aspects of a trial, ranging
from pre-trial community surveys to jury selection and witness preparation. Despite their
prevalence in the modern American courtroom, however, we know very little about the
impact that the use of a trial consultant may have on a jury. When only one side of a case
has access to the resources and skills of a professional consultant, the jury’s notion of a
level playing field may be disturbed. The main purpose of the present study is to
determine whether the use of a trial consultant by one or more opposing parties in the
courtroom can affect a juror’s perception of fairness, ultimately influencing the verdict.
The consulting industry has been quick to respond to the increasing demand for
its services; the American Society of Trial Consultants (ASTC), which began in 1982
with only a handful of members, has grown between six percent and twelve percent every
year for two decades and now encompasses over 400 members (Myers, 2004), with an
estimated 100 to 150 more trial consultants who do not belong to the group (Renaud,
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2001). Not everyone is pleased that business is booming, however. Despite the
increased use of trial consultants by the legal community the industry remains “a
lightning rod for controversy” (Strier, 1999, p. 93). One criticism is the lack of standards
in the field. Given the enormous potential for influence in the legal arena, it astounds
some critics that the trial consulting industry remains largely unregulated. At the present
time, trial consultants can and often do come from a variety of educational and
professional backgrounds (e.g., psychologists, sociologist, attorneys) and do not need a
specific education or training to practice (Lane, 1999). Furthermore, unlike in the fields
of psychology and law, trial consultants have no licensing requirements and are not
bound by any ethical guidelines/principles or codes of conduct. “In fact, anyone can be a
trial consultant because there are no qualifications or educational requirements” (Griffith,
Hart, Kessler, & Goodling, 2007, p. 149).
Some argue that this lack of standards is unfair. For example, Theresa Zagnoli, a
past president of the ASTC Foundation, states that, “‘Those of us who are leaders in this
field and who do solid, scientific research and have years of training…want to continue
to enhance the image of the profession…it’s very difficult to do that if you let anyone in
your only national organization’” (Myers, 2004, p. 1). Others (e.g., Moran, 2001)
believe that enacting regulations and standards for those who practice trial consulting is
unnecessary, arguing that, “jury consulting is not an established discipline with a corpus
of knowledge prerequisite to competent performance” (p. 83). The first ever formal
debate over whether to accredit members of the trial consulting industry was held in 2004
at the annual meeting of the ASTC, and the topic will most likely continue to generate
discussion for some time to come. In the meantime, the ASTC has established a Code of
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Professional Standards and a formal grievance procedure (New, Schwartz, & Giewat,
2006) to address some of the concerns that plague the field. Essentially, the Grievance
Committee of the board has the authority to apply sanctions ranging from written
admonishment to suspension or expulsion from ASTC. There is currently no formal
professional costs associated with a violation of the code, however, since a member who
is expelled from ASTC can continue to practice as a trial consultant (along with the many
trial consultants who have chosen not to join the organization in the first place)
(Lieberman & Sales, 2007).
Not nearly as straightforward are the issues of efficacy and fairness, the two
topics that have generated the most controversy and criticism in the trial consulting
industry. Some researchers have speculated that public scrutiny has increased in recent
years due to the spate of high profile cases involving trial consultants, such as O. J.
Simpson, Rodney King, Reginald Denny, Bernhard Goetz, William Kennedy Smith, and
the McDonalds’ hot coffee case (Kressel & Kressel, 2002; Strier, 1999). Most recently,
trial consultants were used in the trials of Michael Jackson, Scott Peterson, and Martha
Stewart (Chawkins, 2005; Dearen, 2004; “Traits of the Right Juror”, 2004).

In all of

these cases, trial consultants were able to help obtain favorable verdicts for their clients,
which helped to both increase the popularity of the field and draw attention to its
perceived weaknesses. Those in support of the field have gone so far as to speculate that,
“there is even talk that in the future, failure to use trial scientists during trial preparation
could amount to legal malpractice” (Gordon, 1995, p. 9). Likewise, Atlanta criminal
defense attorney Brian Steel says he’s “found consultants so critical to the defense team
that he calculates their cost when he quotes clients a fee” (Renaud, 2001, p. 3).
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Although accolades such as these abound in the legal community, it is critical to
address the fact that many in both the legal and social scientific communities are not
similarly impressed. Fulero and Penrod (1990b), for example, claim that the academic
community is not warmly receptive of the field, remaining skeptical of both the ethics
and the efficacy involved in trial consulting. Barber (1994) warns that the growth of jury
science over the past decade has ramifications for the fundamental fairness of our jury
system. Galen (1992) sums up the feelings of many critics of the industry when he states
that the services of a trial consultant may be “more art than science” (p. 108), a statement
that will be examined in greater detail in the next section.
Although all of these issues are important, this study focuses on a neglected
aspect of the use of trial consultants in jury trials: whether or not the use of a trial
consultant by one or more opposing parties in the courtroom can impact the outcome -the actual determination by a juror of a defendant’s guilt or innocence -- of a trial. An
affiliate of the National Legal Research Group asserted that the public has come to see
that “‘we’re not stacking juries and we’re not engaging in mind control. We’re just
another member of the team’” (Renaud, 2001, p. 5). As consultants become increasingly
visible and accepted in the courtroom, there is a need to determine if a trial consultant is
just another member of the legal team, or if jurors may perceive the presence of a trial
consultant in a negative light. Stolle, Robbennolt, and Wiener (1996) found that a trial
was perceived by participants as being more fair if both the prosecution and defense had
access to trial consultants or neither did, particularly when the outcome favored the
prosecution/plaintiff. Additionally, in the only study known to examine how eligible
jurors view trial consultants, Griffith et al. (2007) found that eighteen percent of
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participants indicated that if they knew that one side was using a trial consultant, they
would be biased against the side that hired the consultant.
Research has also shown that bias tendencies decrease when people are
confronted with clear proof of guilt or innocence, and increase when the weight of the
evidence decreases (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1987). It is
therefore possible that in cases where the evidence is not clear-cut, an imbalance of trial
consultants could impact a juror’s likelihood to convict the defendant. The main
objective of the present study is to investigate this and related possibilities.
One way of assessing the fairness of trial consulting is through the principles and
concepts of procedural justice. Currently, concerns about the processes through which
decisions are made form the basis of what is referred to as procedural justice (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975). As Stolle et al. (1996) state, “The methodologies developed in the
context of exploring procedural justice theory provide a suitable framework for
operationalizing, quantifying, and measuring soft variables such as fairness.
Consequently, procedural justice theory may act as a vehicle for systematically and
empirically evaluating the perceived fairness of trial consulting” (p. 7). Research in a
variety of other legal arenas have used this framework to evaluate the perceived fairness
and overall legitimacy of Supreme Court decision making (Tyler & Rasinski, 1991),
alternative dispute resolution techniques (MacCoun, Lind, & Tyler, 1992), methods for
resolving medical malpractice claims (Poythress, Schumacher, & Wiener, 1993), and
civil tort proceedings (Lind, MacCoun, & Ebener, 1990). Because criteria such as
accuracy have traditionally been viewed as easier to operationalize, quantify, and
measure than “soft” variables such as fairness (Fondacaro, 1995), empirical trial
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consulting literature has tended to focus more on efficacy than ethicality or fairness.
Stolle et al. (1996) emphasize, however, that the legal legitimacy of trial consulting is
largely dependent upon the criteria of fairness presented in the social scientific procedural
justice literature. It is imperative, therefore, that more studies use procedural justice
theory to investigate the perceived fairness of trial consulting.
The purpose of this study is twofold. First, this study seeks to fill some of the
gaps in the trial consulting literature by exploring what, if any, impact the use of a trial
consultant can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial. Second, this study explores
the intervening mechanisms behind the trial consultant - verdict link. Why might the
balance of trial consultants affect the likelihood of conviction in a criminal trial? This
paper examines the possibility that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationship
between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is
ambiguous. Chapter 2 includes background information on the field of trial consulting,
including a summary of the issues surrounding the efficacy and fairness of the industry.
Chapter 3 provides a brief literature review on the history of procedural justice, paying
particular attention to Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group-value model and the relational
concerns of trust, neutrality, and status recognition. Chapter 4 summarizes the limitations
of the trial consulting research and presents the study’s hypotheses. Chapter 5 provides
an overview of the methods used to test the hypotheses in the present study. Chapter 6
describes the analyses and results of the pilot study. Chapter 7 describes the analyses and
results of the present study. Chapter 8 details the implications and contributions of the
present study, as well as its limitations and directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
Review of the Trial Consulting Literature
The roots of scientific jury selection are frequently cited as beginning in 1971
with the trial of the “Harrisburg Seven,” a group of Vietnam War protestors who were
accused of conspiring to kidnap then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (Barber, 1994;
Stolle et al., 1996; Strier, 1999). When sociologist Jay Schulman and his colleagues
came to the assistance of the defense and helped to select the jury, the verdict was 10 to 2
for acquittal and a new field had taken hold. Prior to this time, attorneys had to rely on
their own personal and trial experience, or seek guidance from a variety of trial
specialists who offered conflicting guidance (Diamond, 1990). The field has expanded
considerably in the past 30 plus years; according to Strier (2001), a 1995 estimate of $400
million in industry revenues “easily may now have doubled” (p. 70). DecisionQuest, a
California-based firm with over a dozen offices nationwide, alone grossed nearly $300
million in revenues in 2003 (Myers, 2004). More up to date statistics regarding typical
fees, individual compensation, and industry revenue are not readily available. In fact,
Posey and Wrightsman (2005) report that a participant on the ASTC listserv tried to
determine the current range of hourly fees, but the general reaction was a complete
rejection of this inquiry.
What is known is that business has been particularly brisk in the past twenty
years. As Bennett and Hirschhorn (1993) state, “In the age of massive TV consumption,
‘law and order’ hysteria, the war on crime and tort reform, the need for someone to assist
lawyers in jury selection and other emotional parts of a case has become paramount” (p.
2). Celebrity status trials involving O.J. Simpson, the Menendez brothers, and the Exxon
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Valdez propelled jury consultants into the limelight (Gordon, 1995). More recently,
Martha Stewart’s attorneys hired a trial consultant when she was scheduled for trial in
early 2004, as did Scott Peterson’s attorneys in mid 2004. The use of trial consultants has
even been glamorized in popular films such as “Runaway Jury” (Downer & Fleder,
2003). Although the field has garnered much of its attention from the criminal litigation
mentioned above, it is now more common for trial consultants to be used in large-scale
civil litigations, such as securities fraud and antitrust cases (Ellis, 2005).
Because the field of scientific jury selection now reaches far beyond the jury
selection phase of the trial, the term “trial consulting” is more commonly used to reflect
the broader role played by those in the industry. Whereas “jury selection consultants” of
the past would construct a model of a potential juror favorable to their client’s case and
use this knowledge to attempt to choose a jury panel to fit this characterization (Lane,
1999), today’s trial consultants employ a variety of techniques to assist attorneys during
all aspects of a trial. For example, two commonly used methods are the community
survey, which is a survey conducted to derive demographic and attitudinal profiles of
community members most likely to appear on a jury panel, and the mock trial, which
involves a full dress rehearsal of a case in order to assist attorneys with voir dire, opening
arguments, witness testimony for each side, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, and
jury deliberations. As these and other techniques used by trial consultants have gained
popularity, the issues of efficacy and fairness have come under increased scrutiny.
With regard to the matter of efficacy, some researchers have asserted that trial
consultants cannot effectively predict juror behavior (e.g., Diamond, 1990; Lane, 1999).
Other researchers dispute this claim, arguing that there is empirical evidence linking
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scientific jury selection with juror behaviors and verdicts (e.g., Fulero & Penrod, 1990b;
Stolle et al., 1996). The other issue, fairness, tends to center around two concerns:
Whether the industry is inherently unfair because it is accessible only to the wealthy and
privileged, and whether the use of a trial consultant violates principles of impartiality,
judgment by peers, and democracy. These criticisms will be discussed in greater detail in
the next section.
Trial Consulting: Art or Science?
Are the Procedures Used by Trial Consultant’s Effective?
Does hiring a trial consultant really improve the odds of winning a case? Debate
on this topic continues to rage, particularly in the academic community. Cases such as
the 1980 federal antitrust trial between AT&T and MCI have helped win the support of
“some of the finest and most critical legal minds in the nation” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 4).
A mock trial held to pretest the arguments of MCI’s lawyers accusing AT&T of
monopolistic practices found that when a jury heard the MCI lawyers mention lost profits
totaling $100 million, those mock jurors decided to award exactly that amount. When
another mock trial was held with different jurors and MCI’s lawyers did not request any
particular figure, the group awarded $900 million. As a result of these findings, MCI’s
attorneys devised strategies for jury selection and case presentation that ultimately
resulted in a $600 million verdict against AT&T (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).
Despite such successes, critics of the field point to the lack of empirical research
supporting its usefulness. Diamond (1990), for example, reminds us that despite the high
success rates claimed by consultants in obtaining favorable verdicts for their clients, “no
one has yet produced convincing evidence that advice on jury selection made the
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difference. The demands of the courtroom preclude a full controlled test of the technique
in the courtroom setting” (p. 179). Admittedly, researchers like Diamond (1990) and
Strier (1999) are correct when they point out that it is impossible to assert that a
successful verdict in an actual trial is directly and solely attributable to scientific jury
selection. The factors involved are too confounded: The client who can afford a trial
consultant is usually the same client who can afford the best attorneys, the best experts,
and the best investigators. However, researchers like Bornstein (1999) have shown that
simulation studies can and do provide valid results when doing research in the legal
arena; when Bornstein (1999) compared different trial mediums (e.g., live trial vs. brief
written summaries in a simulation study), no effect was found in the majority of cases.
One major problem with the empirical research supporting the use of trial
consultants is in the way the research is interpreted. While early research investigating
the associations between juror characteristics and verdict tendencies found only weak to
moderate sized relationships, Wiener and Stolle (1997) point out that more recent studies
have found that juror characteristics account for meaningful, albeit small, percentages of
variance (4% to 31%) in criminal verdicts (e.g., Penrod, 1990; Visher, 1987). Fulero and
Penrod (1990b) examined the results of empirical studies that had attempted to link
demographic and personality variables (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, occupation,
demeanor/appearance, wealth and social status, religion, marital status, and age) to jury
verdicts. In general, Fulero and Penrod (1990b) detected modest relationships between
demographic and personality variables and jury verdicts, with the variance explained in
verdict preferences ranging from approximately five to fifteen percent. Although up to
that point in time there were a number of studies linking demographic and personality
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variables to attitudes, there was much less support for the notion that these variables
could be linked to juror verdicts. The distinction is important; as Fulero and Penrod
(1990b) make clear, this link must be established in order to show that scientific jury
selection works.
Similarly, Visher’s (1987) study focused on juror decision making in sexual
assault cases. After interviewing 331 jurors, she assessed jurors’ characteristics and
attitudes on crime as well as defendant and victim characteristics. An evaluation of the
trial evidence showed modest but significant correlations between predeliberation verdict
preferences and education (r = .15), race (r = .15), occupational status (r = .12), attitudes
on crime (r = .16), and tendency to blame victims (r = .22). Using a hierarchical
regression analysis, Visher found that evidence accounted for 34% of the variance in jury
verdicts, victim and defendant characteristics accounted for 8% of the variance, and 2%
of the variance was accounted for by juror characteristics and attitudes. A mock trial
study conducted by Penrod (1990) looked at the verdicts of 367 actual jurors in four
simulated trials in order to assess the impact of various attitudinal and demographic
characteristics on verdicts. When each verdict was separately regressed over 21
attitudinal and demographic items, the overall variance explained in verdicts by these
variables ranged between 4.9% and 14.1% for each variable. Penrod (1990) also found
that no single predictor worked in more than two of the cases and the highest correlation
between any two verdicts was only -.13.
While some might view these relatively weak relationships as evidence of
ineffectiveness, Fulero and Penrod (1990b) point out that a small amount of variance in
this context is not insignificant. As Penrod and Cutler (1985) explain, for example, an
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attorney acting randomly on a fifty percent favorable and fifty percent unfavorable jury
pool would correctly classify fifty percent of the jurors. If, however, a jury survey
detected a relationship in which five percent of the variance in verdict was accounted for
by attitudinal and personality measures, an attorney would increase his/her performance
to sixty-one percent correct classifications by using that information. If fifteen percent of
the variance was accounted for, performance would increase to sixty-nine percent correct.
Fulero and Penrod (1990b) believe that this assistance during voir dire should not be
minimized: “Clearly, although the percentage of variance explained may be small, the
potential improvement in selection performance is not insignificant. If a defendant has
his life or millions of dollars at stake, the jury selection advantages conferred by
scientific jury selection techniques may well be worth the investment” (pp.
250-251).
In an attempt to further clarify the usefulness of social science for trial
preparation, Wiener and Stolle (1997) conducted a series of studies to investigate the
influence of demographic and attitudinal variables on jury decision making in a capital
murder case. In addition, the researchers examined attorneys’ beliefs as to which
variables they thought to be predictive of verdicts and sentence outcomes in the same
capital murder case. The results indicated that attorneys believed more factors to be
influential than actually were. For example, attorneys indicated that marital status, race,
political ideology, and attitudes toward African Americans, handgun control, and illegal
drugs were all influential in trying to distinguish which way jurors would vote. In fact,
none of these factors differentiated between jurors’ verdicts or correlated with the
certainty of the jurors in their verdicts. On the other hand, some of the factors that did
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differentiate among the actual jurors’ verdicts were not chosen as significant
demographic attributes. For example, the status of parenthood distinguished between the
not guilty and guilty voting jurors, but the attorneys did not recognize this variable as an
important factor in separating life imprisonment from death sentencing jurors. Wiener
and Stolle (1997) speculate that without the assistance of a jury survey, it is very likely
that the attorneys would eliminate the wrong variables and would base their selections on
faulty assumptions. The skills of a trial consultant would therefore prove to be useful.
Summing up an extensive review of the research assessing the effectiveness of scientific
jury selection, Lieberman and Sales (2007) conclude that, “determining the effectiveness
of scientific jury selection is difficult because there are not many published studies that
have directly examined the technique; the studies that do exist are methodologically
flawed in a variety of ways” (p. 165). However, they go on to state that, “if scientific
jury selection creates even minimal improvement in an attorney’s ability to identify and
eliminate a biased juror, then the use of this approach can be worthwhile” (p. 165).
The studies examined by Fulero and Penrod (1990b) and the investigation by
Wiener and Stolle (1997) illustrate one of the most glaring problems with the research
that has been conducted on the effectiveness of the trial consulting industry: the almost
exclusive focus upon jury selection. As mentioned before, jury selection is just one part
of a trial consultant’s job. Nevertheless, investigations into the usefulness of holding
mock trials or assisting with voir dire, opening arguments, witness testimony for each
side, closing arguments, judge’s instructions, or jury deliberations have been virtually
ignored (Lieberman & Sales, 2007). Stolle et al. (1996) believe that research that
includes these aspects of a consultant’s job may very well impact effectiveness; as some
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commentators have suggested, the amount of variability in juror verdicts that is
accounted for by the trial consultant’s intervention may increase considerably if new trial
preparation techniques are used in conjunction with scientific jury selection. They
lament, however, the fact that no empirical evaluations of the combined use of such
techniques currently exist in the academic literature. Clearly, future research on the
effectiveness of trial consulting should include variables beyond the dimension of jury
selection. The next section will focus on fairness, which has received more attention than
efficacy from researchers in the legal and psychological community.
Are the Procedures Used by Trial Consultants Ethical and/or Fair?
Debate in this area is focused on two separate issues: Whether the field of trial
consulting is inherently unfair because it is accessible only to the wealthy and privileged
due to its high cost, and whether its use violates principles of impartiality, judgment by
peers, and democracy. Barber (1994) is just one of many detractors who fear that jury
science is a “phenomenon that has ballooned over the past twenty years and threatens to
undermine the basic values of our jury system” (p. 1226). One problem is the escalating
cost of trial consultants; consequently, those litigants most likely to need a consultant are
least likely to be able to afford the steep price tag of that consultant. Because
corporations, governments, and wealthy people can most typically afford the service, the
concept of a fair trial may be undermined. When only one side can afford jury selection
experts, it creates an imbalance similar to the imbalance that can result from a mismatch
of other client resources (e.g., the quality of lawyer and legal resources one can afford;
Strier, 1999).
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Are the poor at a disadvantage? A position often cited in the literature is that
scientific jury selection is only a moderately successful method that is used by zealous
attorneys advocating for their clients, and that this usually amounts to an unethical
advantage for the rich at the expense of poorer litigants. Furthermore, it is often argued
that if the use of a trial consultant can provide an advantage, only large corporations and
wealthy individuals will have access to this advantage, therefore leaving the average
litigant with “some form of second-class justice” (Stolle et al., 1996, p. 4). Others, on the
other hand, argue that trial consultants continue to be unfairly plagued by
misunderstanding and skepticism. In the article “Tipping the scales in favor of one side”
published in the Illinois Legal Times (1996), LaDonna Carlton of Carlton Trial
Consulting addresses the public misconception that only people with a lot of money use
trial consultants, and thus have the advantage over everyone else in our society. In truth,
she explains, trial consultants are used in civil cases as well as in criminal cases by
people of varying means. Although corporate defense clients far outnumber plaintiffs
lawyers (Gordon, 1995), both plaintiff and defense attorneys use trial consultants to
conduct jury-related research and assist in preparing for trial (Yarborough, 1996). An
article in The National Law Journal discusses how consultants have become fixtures at
major trials in criminal matters and products liability cases. Although their services are
more likely to be found on the defense side in criminal cases, consultants say that federal
prosecutors are making increasing use of their services (Renaud, 2001).
Although a disparity of resources continues to exist, Stolle et al. (1996) point out
that inequities abound in the justice system. Research has shown, for example, that jurors
make higher awards against corporations and government than against individuals. They
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conclude that the high price of trial consulting is no less fair than the high cost of
traditional legal services. Similarly, Tanford and Tanford (1988) argue that “the problem
of disparity of resources, including legal talent, is not new; it has plagued our system for
generations…the solution is not to control or ban the use of psychology, as some have
suggested, but to continue to disseminate scientific information to all lawyers and to
expand what is already being made available” (p. 25). For attorneys, the practice of
hiring consultants is legally permissible, and one could even argue inherently important,
if clients are to be represented to the best of their abilities by using all the tools at their
disposal (Lieberman & Sales, 2007). Furthermore, Lieberman and Sales (2007) assert
that “any imbalance in the courtroom created by the disparate wealth between individuals
or corporations involved in litigation would be present regardless of whether jury
selection consultants were used” (p. 200). Solomon Fulero, an academic jury researcher
and consultant, notes that the Supreme Court determined in 1963 that the assistance of
counsel for indigent defendants is a fundamental right essential to a fair trial and
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and believes that if trial consultants truly are
effective an attempt should be made to level the playing field in cases where it is an issue.
This can be done by providing free trial consulting services to those who cannot afford
them (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).
Such efforts are being made: Some judges have attempted to level the playing
field by appointing consultants to assist indigent defendants. In the Reginald Denny trial,
for example, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge John W. Ouderkirk appointed a trial
attorney at $175 an hour to assist the defense (Barber, 1994). The National Jury Project
(1999) states that it is now almost commonplace in some jurisdictions for public funds to
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be used to enable death-penalty defendants to hire trial consultants. An article in The
Legal Intelligencer featured a retired judge providing free mock jury trials to area
attorneys in order to make the service available for low-budget cases (Stewart, 2002).
State funding of trial consultants is also a possibility and should be considered (Barber,
1994; Stolle et al., 1996). In addition to the question of whether the use of trial
consultants puts the poor at a disadvantage, the issue of fairness has also centered around
whether the use of trial consultants impacts our sense of a level playing field.
Does the use of trial consultants violate principles of impartiality, judgment by
peers, and democracy in our jury system? Of even greater concern to some are the
questions the field of trial consulting raises with regard to these aspects of a level playing
field. When consultants claim that they can influence the outcome of a case, it reinforces
the public’s belief that attorneys are capable of manipulating juries, thereby evading the
requirement of an impartial jury as mandated by the United States Constitution. Such
claims also further the idea that money can buy a verdict, which undermines the public’s
confidence in the jury’s verdict as well as the jury system and the legal profession as a
whole (Lane, 1999). Because the Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States
Constitution ensure the right to a civil or criminal trial by an impartial jury, critics
question the ability of a jury to remain fair and impartial when one or both sides take
advantage of trial consultants’ services. Furthermore, Barber (1994) believes that even if
we can ensure that the use of trial consultants are applied even-handedly, utilizing trial
consulting techniques may still foster the negative societal perception that the jury system
is being undermined or rigged, or that juries can be manipulated and their actions
predicted. One attorney stated that trial consultants “do a great job for the defense in
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defining a profile of somebody who will help get the defendant off. What does that have
to do with rendering a just verdict? Some would argue that jury consultants bastardize
the justice system” (“Tipping the scales in favor of one side,” 1996, p. 1). More
specifically, Gold (1987) argues that many of the psychological techniques used by trial
consultants are designed to influence juries subconsciously and that this “covert
advocacy” threatens to deprive the jury of its ability to function properly. In addition,
there are some who believe that even if trial consultants do not influence the outcome of a
case or unfairly manipulate juries, the field creates a public perception of the jury being
manipulated by psychological devices (Gold, 1987). Strier (1999) warns against
perceptions that may detract from the legitimacy of the jury’s role, pointing out that the
appearance of justice is just as important as the reality when striving to preserve and
maintain public support for the legal institution.
In response to some of these concerns, advocates of the field argue that jury
behavior and trial process are often misunderstood, which in turn exaggerates the
negative impact of lawyers aided by psychologists. Tanford and Tanford (1988) claim
that rather than arming trial lawyers with psychological weapons that can damage jurors’
abilities to decide cases based on evidence, trial consultants have identified a number of
factors that, when communicated to trial lawyers, have decreased the likelihood that these
extraneous influences will affect verdicts. Trial consultants can help lawyers by using
their understanding of jurors’ cognitive processes to counteract existing biases and make
sure their clients’ sides are heard and understood. Tanford and Tanford conclude that the
benefits provided by trial consultants outweigh any possible abuses, and that we have no
reason to fear scientific knowledge nor should we attempt to control its infusion into the
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trial process. Barber (1994) also agrees that using “jury science” helps root out bias by
allowing attorneys to see through dishonest answers from potential jurors during voir
dire. In addition, he thinks that trial consultants help counter the juror misconception that
a defendant is guilty as charged, decreases stereotypes by attorneys, and, when used by
weaker defendants, remains a potentially powerful means for balancing inequities.
Drawing on personal experience, some consultants claim that the jurors
themselves do not feel as if they are being manipulated. In their book entitled Bennett’s
Guide to Jury Selection and Trial Dynamics in Civil and Criminal Litigation, Bennett and
Hirschhorn (1993) maintain that although jurors “may have felt some resentment during
the course of jury selection, once they were sworn in they felt special because they had
been approved by one of those ‘new-fangled things’ called a jury and trial consultant” (p.
3). Furthermore, the authors state that, “In hundreds of cases it has been the rare juror
who has ever continued to hold resentment toward the lawyer for hiring a consultant” (p.
3). Others believe that there may be a difference in perceptions of fairness depending on
whether the trial consultant participates in scientific jury selection or post-selection
services. Strier (1999), for example, hypothesizes that post-selection services (e.g.,
enhancing evidence presentation and argumentation) may seem more acceptable than
scientific jury selection techniques that may seem to transgress the rules of what is a “fair
trial.” There is evidence to support this viewpoint: A research project conducted by
members of the ASTC in 2005 polled more than 500 jury-eligible citizens throughout the
United States. The researchers found that 73 percent of respondents believed that
preparing witnesses to testify is a good idea, 66 percent agreed that it is appropriate for a
witness to practice before testifying, and less than 15 percent believed that witnesses who
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practice their testimony have something to hide (New, Schwartz, & Giewat, 2005).
Although not conducted with trial consultants in mind, research in the area of jury
behavior also indicates that juries are not easy to manipulate. Essentially, the bulk of
studies have shown that jurors do not abdicate their responsibility as fact-finders when
faced with expert evidence (Vidmar, 2000).
Trial Consultants As a Source of Bias
Despite the fact that “trial consultants are surely changing the ways in which we
seek justice in the United States” (Kressel & Kressel, 2002), little empirical evidence
related to the field exists. One area that has received virtually no attention is whether
trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of bias. Can the use of a trial
consultant by one or both opposing parties in the courtroom affect a juror’s perception of
fairness, and consequently impact the outcome of a case? As defined by McDonough
Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984, 464 U.S. 554), an impartial jury is “a jury
capable and willing of deciding a case solely on the evidence before it.” Does the
presence of a trial consultant make this task more difficult? According to Bennett and
Hirschhorn (1993), we should not fear that jurors will resent lawyers who have jury and
trial consultants in the courtroom; in fact, jurors interviewed post-trial have consistently
said that they felt the need to be even more fair in looking at and verbalizing their biases
and prejudices when a trial consultant was present. This issue has not been investigated
empirically, however.
The present study will investigate whether the balance of trial consultants can
serve as a source of bias, particularly in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.
Research has shown that strength of evidence (SOE), a term used to refer to the quantity
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and quality of evidence presented by the plaintiff/prosecution during a trial, influences
jury decisions (e.g., Green, Johns, & Bowman, 1999; Kerr, Niedermeier, & Kaplan,
1999). After reviewing 45 years of empirical research on jury decision making, Devine,
Clayton, Dunford, Seying, and Price (2001) concluded that research related to SOE in
both the laboratory and the field has shown a predictable, strong positive association with
jury verdicts of guilt/liability. In cases where the evidence is more ambiguous, however,
jurors tend to “liberate” themselves from the constraints of the evidence and become
more susceptible to influence from extraneous (biasing) factors (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966).
In other words, studies indicate that bias tendencies decrease when confronted with clear
proof of guilt or innocence, and increase when the weight of the evidence does not clearly
favor one side (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1978).
Baumeister and Darley (1982), for example, investigated whether a jury’s bias in
favor of an attractive defendant may be the result of making reasonable inferences about
the details of the case, and whether this bias would decrease as factual information
increases. The authors conducted two experiments during which they presented
undergraduates with a fictional case of a person arrested for drunk driving. Driving
speed and intoxication level were either made explicit or left ambiguous, and this variable
was crossed with manipulation of the attractiveness of the defendant. Participants
answered questions related to sentencing and their recollection of facts. Results indicated
that bias of jurors in favor of an attractive defendant was significantly reduced when the
factual material in the case was increased.
This paper will investigate the possibility that the balance of trial consultants can
serve as a biasing factor when SOE is ambiguous, thus influencing a juror’s
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determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. More specifically, this paper will
examine whether a defendant’s likelihood of conviction might change as a factor of
evidence strength and balance of trial consultants. Jurors may perceive the party without
the consultant as an underdog and either exonerate the defendant (in situations where the
prosecution alone has a consultant) or compensate the prosecution with a conviction (in
situations where the defendant alone has a consultant). In cases where the evidence is
ambiguous and trial consultants are not balanced between parties, perhaps perceptions of
fairness mediate the trial consultant-verdict link. Based on research that has shown that
biasing factors have little to no impact on jurors when SOE is weak or very strong (e.g.,
Kerr et al., 1999), it is not predicted that the balance of trial consultants will serve as a
biasing factor in cases where the evidence either favors the defense or prosecution.
In order to investigate these possibilities, it is important to determine the impact
that trial consulting procedures have on the perceived fairness of courtroom proceedings
and the outcomes of those proceedings. As mentioned previously, the procedural justice
framework provides us with an effective tool to assess perceived fairness in relation to
trial consulting. The next section will explore procedural justice theory in more detail.
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CHAPTER 3
Review of the Procedural Justice Literature
Procedural justice research evolved from two conceptual models: Thibaut and
Walker’s (1975) focus on dispute intervention procedures and Leventhal’s (1980) focus
on procedures related to questions of resource allocation. The first section of this chapter
briefly reviews these older theories, which emphasize how procedural elements affect
justice judgments. The focus will then turn to Tyler’s contributions to the field, which
target the social cognitive antecedents of procedural justice (beliefs and attitudes that
seem to be close causes of the judgment of a fair procedure). Specifically, the groupvalue model (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) and its three
relational concerns will be examined.
Procedural Justice Background
The Beginning: Equity Theory
Most of the early research on fairness gave disproportionate emphasis to the study
of distributive justice, which focuses on the fairness of rewards (or punishments). The
first model of distributive justice, Adams’s (1965) equity theory, was originally
developed to help explain workers’ reactions to their wages. It has subsequently
developed into a general theory of justice that is used to explain all types of social
interactions, including allocation of pay and romantic relationships (Tyler et al., 1997).
The basic underlying principle of equity theory involves the balance between
contributions and rewards; it predicts that salaries will be perceived as fair if they are in
proportion to the relative contributions made by workers. Furthermore, equity theory
predicts that when this principle is violated (people are either over benefited or under
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benefited), people will feel upset. When a person feels guilty over receiving too much or
angry over receiving too little, he or she is motivated to restore a fair balance between
inputs and outcomes.
There are numerous studies that have supported equity theory by showing that
people become upset when they are either over- or underpaid (e.g., Pritchard, Dunnette,
& Jorgenson, 1972; Greenberg, 1990). Despite the popularity of equity theory and the
empirical support it has received, studies have suggested that most of the work conflicts
observed involve issues other than pay and performance (e.g, Lissak & Sheppard, 1983;
Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987). Questions related to procedure were mentioned by subjects
again and again, leading researchers to suggest the need for a broader justice framework
that also paid attention to how decisions are made (Tyler et al., 1997). Researchers are
now beginning to recognize the critical role played by procedural justice, which focuses
on the fairness of the rules and procedures with which the rewards are distributed.
Thibaut and Walker’s Contribution
The systematic study of the psychology of social decision making procedures
began in the early 1970s with the work of John Thibaut and Laurens Walker. In their
1975 book entitled Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis, Thibaut and Walker
describe a set of studies they performed on the judicial system. According to these
researchers, there are two distinct aspects of legal settings that have the potential to affect
satisfaction: (a) the outcome of a trial (the verdict or judgment given), and (b) the
manner in which the trial is conducted. Thibaut and Walker concentrated on the second
aspect, which they called procedural justice, and explored the nature of the processes
governing dispute resolutions and courtroom deliberations.
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Thibaut and Walker’s theory, which is known as the instrumental model of
procedural justice, united two important areas of social psychology- process and fairnessby hypothesizing that the process by which dispute-resolution decisions are made
influences the satisfaction of litigants with those decisions. According to Thibaut and
Walker (1975), an individual’s view about the fairness of procedures is shaped mainly by
the distribution of control between disputants and the third-party decision-maker. They
identified two types of control: process control, which they refer to as “voice” and refers
to the opportunity to present evidence to decision makers in a case, and decision control,
which refers to the degree of control any one participant has over determining the
outcome of the dispute. Dispute resolution procedures will be perceived as fair to the
extent that disputants are given an opportunity to have their say (process control) and an
opportunity to influence the final decision (decision control). Thibaut and Walker
believed that because people are reluctant to give up control to a third party, the
presentation of evidence (“voice”) is one way to maintain some degree of indirect control
over the decisions of authorities. Thibaut and Walker (1975; 1978) demonstrated that
procedural effects occur independent of the outcome of the litigant’s case, and that
providing disputants with the opportunity to state their claim is the best way to ensure
that the process will be perceived as fair and the ultimate decision accepted as just.
Thibaut and Walker’s work stimulated a great deal of interest in the area of
procedural justice, and their initial research has been confirmed in a wide variety of
subsequent studies in many different areas: Procedural justice has been found to be
important in citizens’ dealings with the police (e.g., Tyler & Folger, 1980), in political
allocations (e.g., Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985), in interpersonal contexts (e.g.,
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Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986), and in organizational settings (e.g., Greenberg, 1987;
Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), to name just a few. “The general finding...has been that
procedural justice is a remarkably potent determinant of affective reactions to decision
making and that procedural justice has especially strong effects on attitudes about
institutions and authorities, as opposed to attitudes about the specific outcome in
question” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p. 179). Furthermore, little difference has been found in
the importance placed upon procedural justice by various ethnic groups. Huo and Tyler
(2001), for example, collected data from a mail survey of Asians, Blacks, Latinos, and
Whites working in a public sector organization. When the authors examined the effect of
ethnicity on how people define procedural justice, no significant differences were found
across ethnic groups. Similarly, Tyler (1988) also found that whites and minorities
define procedural fairness in the same way; no differences with respect to ethnicity (or
gender, income, or other personal characteristics) were found when citizens were asked to
evaluate how fairly they were treated by police officers and judges.
Research has also shown that perceptions of fairness tend to be robust across
ideologies. Studies have shown that people who differ in their social values and/or
political ideologies often tend to agree on whether a particular procedure is fair. For
example, Tyler (1994) sampled Black and White residents of the San Francisco Bay area
regarding the fairness of government decision-making procedures and discovered that
respondents’ judgments about what makes a procedure fair were not affected by political
ideology, ethnicity, gender, education, income, or age.
These empirical findings support the importance that legal scholars attach to the
evaluation of trials by both procedural and outcome criteria. Furthermore, legal scholars
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(e.g., Mashaw, 1985) have recognized that using fair procedures enhances the dignity of
the individual and the individual’s commitment to the law. For example, research has
shown that the willingness of people to accept mediation decisions when pursuing
grievances in federal court was strongly predicted by procedural justice judgments about
the way those decisions were made (Lind et al., 1993).
Thibaut and Walker criticism: extending the framework. Despite the robustness
of their findings, Thibaut and Walker did face skepticism from the legal community and
other social scientists (Tyler & Lind, 1991). This skepticism primarily arose because the
conclusions reached by the two researchers ran counter to the prevailing thinking under
the legal and economics models that dominated the study of dispute resolution during that
time period. Whereas the legal and economics models heavily emphasizes issues of
outcome favorability and assumes that litigants are primarily concerned with whether or
not they win or lose their case (Tyler & Lind, 1991), procedural justice theory asserts that
people are willing to accept and view as fair outcomes that they regard as unfavorable
because of the process through which those outcomes were derived. In addition, because
Thibaut and Walker used a similar approach with almost all of their studies (student
subjects and simulated disputes), their conclusions were open to methodological
criticism.
Although Thibaut and Walker’s model has been important to generating research,
Tyler et al. (1997) assert that it has also served to restrict discussions about the criteria of
procedural justice to control issues alone. In general, there are two main issues when
examining procedural justice: whether procedural justice matters, and the criteria that
people use to evaluate the fairness of procedures. The evidence discussed above seems
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to indicate quite strongly that procedural justice does matter. Much less is known about
the criteria that people use to evaluate procedural fairness. For example, what is it about
a courtroom trial that leads people to evaluate it as fair or unfair? Both Leventhal and
Tyler address this issue by suggesting much broader frameworks that can be used to
evaluate the justice of procedures.
Leventhal’s Contribution
Although Thibaut and Walker are recognized as being the first to systematically
study the concept of procedural justice, their research focused on the comparison of
various dispute resolution procedures available in legal settings. It was not until
Leventhal’s (1976; 1980) work that procedural justice was recognized as a concept that
can be applied to procedures in nonlegal contexts (Folger & Greenberg, 1985). While
Thibaut and Walker’s (1978) model suggests that people view fair procedures as a means
of obtaining equitable outcomes (which is the goal in cases of conflict of interest),
Leventhal’s model recognizes that people are concerned about how decisions are made in
addition to their concerns about what those decisions are.
Leventhal’s six general rules of procedural justice. In contrast to Thibaut and
Walker’s orientation toward procedural justice as a consideration in the disputeresolution process, Leventhal (1976) conceived of procedural justice (what he referred to
as “procedural fairness”) as a neglected aspect of reward allocation. Because researchers
and theorists had come to realize that justice in allocation is a fundamental feature of
most social behavior, Leventhal’s argument that procedural justice is an important
determinant of perceived fairness in the context of almost any allocation decision forged
a link to a wide variety of social settings (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Leventhal is also credited
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with moving beyond Thibaut and Walker’s issues of control and offering other unrelated
criteria as potential bases for evaluating the justice of a procedure (Tyler, 1990). He
presented his theory in two analyses (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980)
in which he identified six general procedural justice “rules” that set fairness standards to
which the procedure in question is compared. The six criteria are as follows:
1. Consistency, which refers to the perceived similarity in procedures and
outcomes across time and people. Consistency across people generally means
that all parties believe they have the same rights and are treated similarly,
whereas consistency across time generally requires that the procedures follow
the same rules and get enacted the same way each time they are used.
2. Bias suppression, which refers to the perceived absence of prejudice or
partiality in a procedure. Leventhal specifically mentions two potential
sources of bias: procedures are unfair if the decision maker has a vested
interest in a specific decision, and procedures are unfair if the decision maker
is so influenced by his or her prior beliefs that he or she fails to give adequate
and equal consideration to all points of view.
3. Accuracy, which refers to the perceived use of correct information and honest
efforts to maintain exactness in procedures (quality of decision). According to
Leventhal, the fairness of a procedure will be higher if an allocation procedure
requires keeping thorough and accurate records of contributions.
4. Correctability, which refers to the perceived presence of opportunities to
amend decisions. Leventhal specifically mentions grievance and appeals
procedures, which must themselves meet the standards set by the other rules.
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5. Representativeness (or “voice”), which refers to the perceived presence of
opportunities for people to express their views and exert influence over the
process and decision. It is the broadest of all Leventhal’s rules and includes
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) process and decision control variables, as well as
subgroup representation in the decision-making group.
6. Ethicality, which refers to the extent to which a procedure is perceived to be
consistent with accepted values or morals. According to Leventhal, the use of
deception, bribery, invasion of privacy, and spying are all examples of how a
procedure might violate the ethicality rule.
According to Leventhal’s analysis, the weighting of procedural rules depends on a
goal-based analysis of the likely effects of each rule. Greater weight is given to
procedural rules when they are believed to promote the attainment of favorable outcomes
for the perceiver or fair outcomes for all persons involved. In addition, Tyler et al.
(1997) point out that people’s ratings of the importance of the criteria vary depending
upon the nature of the situation (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Rasinski, 1992),
which suggests that there is no universally fair or unfair procedure. Barrett-Howard and
Tyler (1996), for example, report that people linked different procedural criteria to the
attainment of different social goals. Whereas accuracy in decision-making was judged as
central to economic productivity (as defined by Deutsch (1975)), the attainment of social
welfare and harmony were more strongly associated with bias suppression and ethicality.
Similarly, Tyler (1988) found that control was important in disputes (conflicts of
interest), but not important in problem-solving situations (truth conflicts), where the
procedures used for resolving disputes were more likely to be judged in terms of
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opportunities for input and consistency of treatment. Studies have also shown that within
a given situation people who differ with regard to age, ethnicity, and other background
characteristics agree about the criteria for procedural fairness (e.g., Tyler, 1988), which
“suggests that there is considerable consensus among Americans about what constitutes a
fair procedure within a particular setting” (Tyler et al., 1997, p. 92).
Empirical support for Leventhal. Leventhal’s theory stimulated a great deal of
research in the area of procedural justice. However, unlike the distributive justice rules
that have been found empirically to affect allocation preferences and fairness judgments,
critics contend that Leventhal’s procedural justice rules are “largely the result of his
intuition and speculation about what makes a procedure fair” (Lind & Tyler, 1988, p.
131). Despite this contention, empirical tests of Leventhal’s model found support for
almost all of his procedural justice rules. Specifically, four studies have found that
consistency is the major criterion used to assess procedural justice (Barrett-Howard &
Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986). More
specifically, Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1986) found consistency across people to be
much more critical when judging the fairness of a procedure than consistency across time
(as reflected by responses to a questionnaire asking subjects to evaluate the importance of
Leventhal’s six criteria in the context of particular settings). Accuracy also emerged as
important in a number of studies (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Cornelius, Kanfer, &
Lind, 1986; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987) as was the issue of suppressing bias (BarrettHoward & Tyler, 1986) and representation (e.g., Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut,
1978; Lind, Lissak, & Conlon, 1983; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987; Tyler, 1987; Tyler,
Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). After reviewing the research in the area, Fondacaro (1995)
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asserted that consistency, accuracy, ethicality, and bias suppression are the dimensions
that contribute most to judgments and perceptions of procedural fairness across different
types of situations involving allocation decisions. Essentially, individuals who perceived
the decision making process to be more consistent, accurate, respectful of personal
dignity, and impartial viewed the process as being more fair. Interestingly, all four of
these criteria were found to be more important than the representativeness criterion
(ranked fifth, for example, in the Barrett-Howard and Tyler (1996) study), which includes
the control judgments central to Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) theory.
Criticism of Leventhal. Because there are six criteria that might be useful when
evaluating the fairness of a procedure, it is critical when defining the meaning of
procedural justice to know the weight placed on each of these criteria by those affected
by decisions. Many researchers, however, fail to operationalize Leventhal’s procedural
justice rules, thereby making it difficult to identify areas of importance. Other
researchers (e.g., Lind and Tyler, 1988) believe that Leventhal’s procedural justice rules
are too broad to be more than a first cut. Studies have shown that the consistency rule
can be broken down, showing a distinction between consistency across persons and
consistency across time (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986). As discussed above,
results of Barrett-Howard and Tyler’s (1986) study indicate that these two types of
consistency differ substantially in their importance, with consistency across people by far
the most important criterion for discerning a fair procedure.
Another problem is that Leventhal’s notion that “procedural fairness is a
necessary precondition for the establishment and maintenance of distributive fairness”
(Leventhal, 1976, p. 230) has not been borne out by empirical research (e.g., Alexander
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& Ruderman, 1987; Kanfer, Sawyer, Earley, & Lind, 1987). For example, Tyler and his
associates have conducted a number of studies investigating whether procedures can have
an impact on perceived fairness that is independent of outcomes. While investigating
leadership endorsement, Tyler and Caine (1981) found that the actual grade given by a
teacher did not significantly influence ratings of overall fairness, although the grading
procedures did. Another study (Tyler & Folger, 1980) examined the relationship between
outcomes and procedures in the context of police-citizen encounters. The authors found
that respondents who felt that they were treated fairly by the police were more likely to
have positive evaluations of their encounters with the police than those who felt unfairly
treated, irrespective of the outcome (whether the police solved the problem or cited the
respondent for a motor vehicle violation). Tyler and Folger (1980) concluded that just as
with fair courtroom procedures, a fair manner of treatment by the police can reduce the
negative impact of not receiving a desired outcome.
The first researchers to conduct research on this topic in the workplace were
Alexander and Ruderman (1987), who looked at the influence of procedural and
distributive fairness on important job-related attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction, turnover
intention). A survey consisting of 20 questions designed to assess the distributive and
procedural aspects of various work activities and policies was administered to
government employees at six Federal installations. Results indicate that although both
the procedural and distributive measures were significantly related to measures of job
satisfaction, evaluation of supervisor, conflict/harmony, trust in management, and
turnover intention, procedural fairness accounted for significantly more variance than
distributive fairness in each of these criterion measures except turnover intention.
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A study conducted by Clay-Warner, Hegtvedt, and Roman (2005a), however,
found that Alexander and Ruderman’s (1987) conclusions may not be so clear-cut.
Unlike Alexander and Ruderman (1987) who used a sample drawn from a single
organization, Clay-Warner et al. (2005a) used a representative sample of workers from
many different kinds of workplaces to study the effect of downsizing on organizational
commitment. They found that distributive justice was a stronger predictor than
procedural justice of organizational commitment among victims of downsizing, while
procedural justice was a better predictor of organizational commitment among survivors
of downsizing as well as among those who had not recently worked in an organization
that downsized (unaffected workers). Specifically, procedural justice explained less than
1% of unique variance in the model for downsizing victims and was not statistically
significant. Distributive justice, on the other hand, was highly significant and explained
12% of unique variance. In the models for unaffected workers and survivors, procedural
justice was statistically significant as well as statistically larger (accounting for 9% of
unique variance) than the corresponding distributive justice variable (which accounted for
3.7% of unique variance.) The finding that the relative importance of procedural and
distributive justice will vary depending on one’s prior experiences with downsizing has
been termed the psychological contract model by Clay-Warner et al. (2005a), and
research is ongoing. A follow-up study (Clay-Warner, Reynolds, & Roman, 2005b)
found that procedural justice was a consistently significant predictor of job satisfaction
among all groups of workers surveyed (reemployed victims of downsizing, downsizing
survivors, and unaffected workers) and, contrary to the psychological contract model, it is
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significantly more important than distributive justice in predicting job satisfaction among
victims.
Overall, studies in different domains have provided support for the contention that
it is the procedures that are followed, and not the outcomes, that are more likely to
influence overall judgments of fairness (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Leventhal’s (1976)
assertion that procedural justice and distributive justice do not have statistically
independent impacts has not been supported by the research. Consequently, “Justice
research has followed the path outlined by this evidence because it finds that the primary
impact on people comes from their judgments about the fairness of procedures…This
does not mean, of course, that people no longer study distributive justice, but that there is
a particularly strong focus in current research on issues of procedural justice” (Tyler &
Blader, 2003, p. 350).
Drawing the Theories Together: Sheppard and Lewicki’s Contribution
Some researchers have pointed out that both Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal’s
different emphases are important; for example, Folger and Greenberg (1985) argue that
both the Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker models are relevant in a multitude of
managerial and human resource practices. Both theories agree that “procedures
providing the involved parties (be they litigants in a courtroom, or reward recipients in an
organization) some control over the procedures affecting their outcomes are essential to
procedural justice” (Folger & Greenberg, 1985, p. 148). Furthermore, Leventhal and
Thibaut and Walker’s theories do overlap in the area of representation: Leventhal states
that all affected parties should have both process and decision control at all stages of
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decision making, and Thibaut and Walker have a conception of control that is fairly
equivalent (Tyler, 1990).
A major criticism of the two theories, however, is their failure to adequately
describe the sorts of rules underlying perceptions of fairness. Tyler et al. (1997), for
example, criticize the popular frameworks, claiming that although the procedural justice
framework of Thibaut and Walker (1975) has been the most influential, it does not define
the concept of procedural justice broadly. And, while Leventhal (1980) takes a broader
theoretical approach, he does not test his ideas (particularly with regard to the weighting
of criteria) through empirical research. As Tyler (1988) states, “what is striking about
these two bodies of theory is the extent to which the criteria they identify as potential
bases for evaluating the justice of a procedure do not overlap. The only common
criterion is representation (Leventhal’s category for process and/or decision control” (p.
105).
Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) attempted to fill this void with a study designed to
identify a more complete set of principles used to evaluate managerial actions. Up until
this point, the criteria used by Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker for assessing the
fairness of a procedure had been examined separately. This study brought them together
by asking 44 managers and management students to describe recent fair and unfair
treatment in seven areas of management responsibility (planning, staff development,
delegating, motivating, coordinating, daily activities, and representing the organization to
the public). Using Tornow and Pinto’s (1976) taxonomy of managerial behavior as a
basis, the authors employed a critical-incident technique to assess the factors that
managers use for judging fairness. Subjects were asked to describe both fair and unfair
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behaviors for each role domain, and to identify the principle or principles violated or
followed by that behavior. Five hundred ten behaviors were ultimately described
involving 747 principles. Responses were coded to yield 16 rules guiding judgments
about perceived managerial fairness. When these rules were aggregated, six major
clusters of fairness concerns emerged: General Rules, Decision-Making Rules, Blaming
or Credit-Giving Rules, Work Assignment Rules, Reward Allocation Rules, and Working
Within System Rules.
Sheppard and Lewicki (1987) concluded that their findings provide empirical
support for several theories related to perceived fairness. All six of Leventhal’s
principles of fairness emerged as rules and appeared to be useful for describing subject
responses, especially consistency, representativeness, and accuracy. The
representativeness and accuracy rules identified in the study were found to relate closely
to Thibaut and Walker’s process control. In addition, Adams’ equity theory was often
invoked when subjects were explaining perceived unfairness. Nine new principles of
fairness also emerged, including reasonableness, golden rule, accountability,
communication, information, timeliness, role description, meaningful assignment, and
structural integrity. The authors concluded that although the theoretical notions of
Leventhal and Thibaut and Walker apply to subordinate perceptions of managerial
fairness, neither the procedural nor distributive justice literatures thoroughly describe the
basis upon which subordinates make fairness judgments. It should be pointed out that
Sheppard and Lewicki’s study was concerned with perceptions of managerial fairness,
and their results cannot be assumed to relate to perceptions of fairness in other contexts
such as jury decisions. For example, the authors speculate that role description,
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meaningful assignment, and structural integrity may be limited to managerial activities.
It was not until Tom Tyler’s research that Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal’s principles
were examined together in a non-managerial setting.
Tyler’s Contribution
The Chicago study. In one of the only studies since Sheppard and Lewicki (1987)
to combine Thibaut and Walker’s criteria for assessing the fairness of a procedure with
those of Leventhal, Tyler (1988) tested the degree of variation in the meaning of
procedural fairness in a non-managerial setting that stretched beyond the arena of
disputes. Tyler (1988) was interested in investigating what it is about a legal procedure
that causes those involved to consider it to be fair. Using the six criteria of fair procedure
suggested by Leventhal to form a basis for exploring the meaning of fair process in the
context of citizen dealings with the police and courts, Tyler examined whether the
meaning of procedural justice varies depending upon the circumstances of an encounter
with a legal authority. Participants were 652 citizens of Chicago who had indicated
during a random sample telephone interview that they had had personal experience with
the Chicago police or courts within the past year.
The extent to which respondents had process control was measured by asking
them “how much opportunity” they were given to present their case to the authorities
before a decision was reached. Tyler (1988) measured perceived decision control by
asking respondents how much influence they had over the decisions made by the
authorities. Because process and decision control were highly intercorrelated (r = .56; p
<.001), Tyler combined them into a single measure of representation which mirrored
Leventhal’s representativeness criterion.
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Leventhal’s (1980) first criterion of procedural justice is consistency, and Tyler
(1988) chose to measure four types of consistency. Consistency across time was assessed
by asking respondents to compare whether their current outcomes and treatment were the
same, better, or worse than the outcomes and treatment they had received in past
experiences; consistency across people “in similar situations” was assessed by asking
respondents whether the outcomes and treatment they received was the same, better, or
worse than the outcomes and treatment others have received in like circumstances;
consistency with prior expectations was assessed by asking respondents to indicate
whether their outcomes and treatment was the same, better, or worse than they had
expected; and consistency in relationships was assessed by asking respondents whether
their outcomes and treatment was the same, better, or worse than the outcomes and
treatment of friends, family, or neighbors. From these, Tyler (1988) created two indices
of consistency: the average of respondent judgments concerning their outcome and the
average of respondent judgments concerning their treatment.
Tyler subdivided Leventhal’s bias suppression criteria (which Tyler refers to by
the dimension name of “impartiality” or “neutrality”) into three subcategories consisting
of lack of bias, honesty, and effort to be fair. The first, lack of bias, was assessed by
asking respondents whether their treatment or outcome was influenced by race, sex, age,
nationality, or some other characteristics of them as a person, as well as whether the
authorities had favored one party over another. The second, honesty, was assessed by
combining the responses to two questions: (1) whether the authorities had done anything
that was dishonest or improper, and (2) whether officials had lied to them. The third,
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making an effort to be fair, was assessed by asking respondents how hard the police or
judge had tried to show fairness.
Tyler (1988) measured the accuracy of decision making by combining responses
to two questions: whether the authorities involved had been provided with the
information they needed to make good decisions about how to handle the problem, and
whether the authorities had tried to bring the problem into the open to be solved.
Correctability was measured by asking respondents whether they knew of any agency or
organization to which they could have complained of fair treatment. Finally, ethicality
was measured by combining responses to two questions: whether the authorities had
been polite and whether they had shown concern for their rights.
Tyler’s (1988) key dependent variable for the analysis of the meaning of
procedural justice was the respondents’ judgment about the fairness of the process during
their experience with the police and/or courts. Respondents were asked to judge “how
fair” the procedures used by the authorities were, “how fairly” they were treated, and how
fair the authorities were with whom they had dealt. Six respondent characteristics were
also measured: sex, age, race, education, liberalism, and income.
As previous research had found (e.g., Tyler & Folger, 1980; Alexander &
Ruderman, 1987), outcome favorability was related to judgments of procedural and
distributive fairness (mean r = .34), but the two were clearly distinct. Specifically, those
who received favorable outcomes thought that those outcomes and the procedures used to
arrive at them were more fair. Results of a factor analysis indicated that judgments of
procedural justice are multidimensional, involving many issues in addition to favorability
of outcome and control of outcome. In fact, consistency, the criterion most closely
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related to outcomes, was found to be of minor importance. Rather, judgments related to
the social dimensions of the experience, such as ethicality, weighed very heavily in
assessments of procedural justice. Seven different aspects of procedure independently
influenced citizen judgments regarding whether they were treated fairly by legal
authorities: (a) the degree to which the authorities were motivated to be fair; (b)
judgments of their honesty (belief that decision makers should be honest and reach their
decisions based on objective information about the case); (c) the degree to which the
authorities followed ethical principles of conduct (treated politely and having respect
shown for their rights and themselves as people); (d) the extent to which opportunities for
representation were provided (belief on the part of those involved that they had an
opportunity to take part in the decision-making process); (e) the quality of the decisions
made (whether the procedures produce fair outcomes); (f) the opportunities for error
correction; and (g) whether the authorities behaved in a biased fashion.
Tyler (1988) concluded that the meaning of procedural justice varied according to
the nature of the situation, rather than the characteristics of the people involved. While
this indicates it is unlikely that there are any universally fair procedures for allocation and
dispute resolution, it also suggests that different types of people within American culture
have a similar definition of procedural justice. This, in turn, implies that members of our
society share cultural beliefs regarding definitions of the meaning of justice within certain
settings, a suggestion that has found support in ethnographic studies of the courts (e.g.,
Merry, 1985; 1986). Tyler (1988) believes that this lack of personal differences has
important consequences for interactions between citizens as well as for interactions
between citizens and authorities. Common values not only make it more likely that all
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parties will focus on similar issues when attempting to find a process for dealing with the
issue in question, but will also help facilitate the acceptance of decisions in disputes since
both parties are likely to share a conception of what the authorities should be doing.
Although most researchers have followed Thibaut and Walker’s lead and
emphasized issues related to process and decision control (e.g., representation), results of
Tyler’s (1988) study indicate that representation is only one of a number of important
concerns that define fair processes. As Tyler (1988) points out, “It is noteworthy that the
major criteria used to assess process fairness are those aspects of procedure least linked to
outcomes- ethicality, honesty, and the effort to be fair- rather than consistency with other
outcomes. This reinforces the… suggestion that procedural issues are distinct from
concerns with outcomes” (p. 128). Other studies conducted by Tyler and his associates
also indicated a noninstrumental benefit of process control (e.g., Tyler et al., 1985; Tyler,
1987; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990). Lind et al. (1990), for example, found that people
value voice even after the decision has been made. People were allowed to present
evidence either before a decision that affected them or after the decision had already been
made. After comparing these two conditions to a third condition in which people had no
input into the decision, the authors found that although the magnitude of the process
control effect diminished, it failed to disappear in the post-decision input condition. They
concluded that even when people can’t influence the likelihood of obtaining desired
outcomes, a good process can still lead to satisfaction. In contrast, the instrumental
perspective believes that people react to their experiences depending on the favorability
of the outcomes of the experiences. It was this evidence indicating that the instrumental
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perspective is inadequate to account for procedural justice findings that lead Tyler and
Lind (1988) to propose the group-value theory of procedural justice.
A Group-Value Theory of Procedural Justice: The Relational Model
Lind and Tyler (1988; Tyler, 1989; Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposed a group-value
theory of procedural justice as an alternative explanation for procedural justice effects.
Up until this point, there had been an almost exclusive focus on motivational
explanations to account for how people decide whether they have received fair treatment
from others. The instrumental perspective believes that individuals are viewed as
wanting to achieve desired outcomes and as judging the value of their opportunities to
speak by the extent to which those opportunities facilitate the achievement of those
outcomes (Tyler, 1990). From this perspective, judgments of procedural justice are
influenced by procedural justice issues that have little to do with outcome favorability or
control. Lind and Tyler’s (1988) group-value model suggests that Thibaut and Walker’s
control theory misses important noninstrumental motives of the psychology of procedural
justice. Their theory was extended to the context of authority relations in the relational
model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992).
Although the relational model and Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) control model
both assume that the acceptance of the decisions and policies of third-party authorities is
linked to perceptions of procedural justice, the relational model provides a different
explanation of why people are motivated to care about procedural fairness. Instead of the
instrumental motive suggested by the control theory, the relational theory is social in
nature and believes that individuals are motivated to affiliate with groups and to view
themselves as important members of desirable groups. Consequently, it is assumed that
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people are concerned about their long-term social relationship with the authorities or
institutions acting as third parties, rather than viewing them as one-shot deals. Lind and
Tyler believe that people want to be treated fairly as members of a group because fair
treatment acknowledges their membership and status within the group, as well as
maintains the values of the group.
Research conducted by Tyler (1989; 1994b) found that judgments about the
quality of social relationships between individuals and decision makers had a greater
influence on procedural justice judgments than instrumental judgments of control over
the procedures and the favorability of outcomes resulting from the procedures. Tyler
(1989) built upon Leventhal’s (1976) framework when he identified three relational
concerns that dominate judgments of procedural fairness: the trustworthiness of the
authorities enacting the procedures (trust), the neutrality of those authorities (neutrality),
and information about the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition). The
following section explains these three relational concerns in greater detail.
Trust. Trust involves assessments of the motives of authorities, such as
judgments about their benevolence and concern for the needs of those with whom they
deal. Trust also involves the belief that third parties desire to treat people in a fair and
reasonable way. Because people’s commitment to the group changes as their attributions
about the intentions of the authorities change (Tyler, 1989), they are more likely to
develop a long-term commitment to the group if they believe that the authorities are
trying to be fair and equitable.
Neutrality. Incorporates four of Leventhal’s (1976) criteria- consistency, bias
suppression, accuracy, and correctability. Neutrality involves assessments of the degree
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to which decision-making procedures are unbiased, honest, and promote decisions based
on evidence. Because in a long-term relationship people cannot always have what they
want, it is not realistic to focus on outcome favorability in any specific situation. Lind
and Tyler (1988) suggest that people assume that everyone will benefit from fair
decision-making procedures over the long-term. The focus, therefore, is not on whether a
favorable outcome is received in any situation, but rather whether the authority has
created a neutral arena in which to resolve the conflict. It is the “level playing field” that
matters; “in any particular situation people will be concerned with having an unbiased
decision maker who is honest and who uses appropriate factual information to make
decisions” (Tyler, 1989, p. 831).
Status Recognition. Similar to Leventhal’s (1976) dimension of ethicality. Status
recognition, or standing, involves assessments of politeness, treatment with dignity, and
respect for rights and entitlements due to each group member. According to Tyler
(1989), people care about their standing in a group, and the way a person is treated during
social interactions gives people information about their status within the group. If people
are not treated well, they know that the authority they are dealing with regards them as
having a low status within the group.
Tyler (1989) acknowledges that merely demonstrating noncontrol effects does not
provide adequate support of the group-value theory; rather, valid evidence for the validity
of the group-value model must show that people care about neutrality, trust, or standing
because they care about group status and group membership. In order to test this theory,
Tyler (1989) conducted telephone interviews with a random sample of 652 Chicago
residents who had experience with the police or court system. Subjects’ outcome
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favorability was assessed in absolute terms by coding respondent statements indicating
the nature of the experience’s outcome (e.g., in the case of calls to the police, respondents
were asked if the police had solved the problem for which they had been summoned). An
Outcome Favorability scale was then formed by weighing these judgments of outcome
favorability against the self-reported seriousness of the problem. Outcome favorability
was also assessed relative to four standards of reference (e.g., respondents were asked to
compare their experience with experiences they have had in the past).
Other independent variables examined included process control (assessed by
asking how much opportunity was given to present a problem or side before a decision
was made) and decision control (assessed by asking how much influence was given over
the decisions made by the third party), which were averaged to form a single control
index. Scales were also created to reflect responses given by subjects to questions
focusing on neutrality, trust, and standing. Dependent variables included respondents’
judgment about the fairness of the procedures used during their experience with legal
authorities, the fairness of the outcome received, affect felt toward the authorities (e.g.,
angry, frustrated, pleased) and the overall fairness of the authorities. Tyler (1989) found
that the variables of neutrality, trust, and standing accounted for a significantly larger
share of the variance in procedural fairness judgments than did the control variables of
process and decision control. Furthermore, results of a regression analysis indicate that
issues of trust and standing within the group are especially important in determining both
people’s judgments about whether they have received procedural justice and their
reactions to their experience. When the issue of concern is outcome fairness, neutrality
becomes the most important variable. Tyler (1989) concluded that people care about
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more than just the problem that brought them to a third party: the relationship to the third
party is also important.
Further empirical support for Tyler. A number of subsequent studies have also
found support for the relational model. For example, Tyler (1994) conducted two studies
to examine reactions and motives in relation to experiences with two types of authoritylegal and managerial. In the first study, survey interviews were conducted over the
telephone with a random sample of Chicago residents who had had a personal experience
with legal authorities. Participants were asked to evaluate four aspects of their
experience that were thought to reflect resource concerns (concerns over maximizing
personal rewards when interacting with others): the favorability of the outcome of the
experience, the outcome received relative to prior expectations, the outcome relative to
what others would have received, and control of the decisions made (decision control).
Respondents were also asked about their control over evidence presentation (process
control), as well as about their experiences with the relational issues of neutrality, trust,
and standing. Tyler used structural equation modeling to compare the fit of various
possible models of the dimensions of justice. Six possible models of the justice motive
were constructed: (a) a saturated model, in which indices of both the resource and the
relational motives were hypothesized to influence distribute and procedural justice
judgments; (b) a resource-dominated model, in which the influence of relational motives
on distributive justice was removed; (c) a relation-dominated model, in which the
influence of resource motives on procedural justice was removed; (d) a resource-only
model which hypothesized that resource motives shape judgments of both distributive
and procedural justice; (e) a relation-only model which hypothesized that relational
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motives shape judgments of both distributive and procedural justice; and (f) the dual
process model, which hypothesized that justice judgments are shaped by both distributive
justice and its underlying resource motives and procedural justice and its underlying
relational motives. When the models were compared, the model that best fit the data was
the relation-dominated model. More specifically, Tyler found two distinct justice
motives: distributive justice judgments were shaped by both resource and relational
judgments, but procedural justice judgments were shaped only by the relational concerns
of neutrality, trust, and standing.
In the second study, Tyler examined managerial authority by drawing a random
telephone sample of adults in the Chicago area. Respondents were required to work at
least 20 hours per week and to have a supervisor with whom they had had a recent
personal experience. Participants were asked about their satisfaction with the outcome of
their experience and their control over the decisions that were made, as well as to
evaluate the outcome they received relative to their expectations and the outcome relative
to what others would have received (all reflect resource concerns). Respondents were
also asked about their control over evidence presentation (process control) and about their
experiences with the relational issues of neutrality, trust, and standing. Just as in the first
study, results indicate that the relation-dominated model best fit the data. The second
study therefore successfully replicated the first study using an independent data set and a
separate setting.
Lind, Tyler, and Huo (1997) performed several studies to investigate how dyadic
procedures differ from that of authoritative procedures. In the first study, students were
asked to recall a conflict and write a brief description of the dispute on the experimental
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questionnaire. In the second study, students were asked to rate third party and dyadic
procedures as ways of resolving a hypothetical dispute. Eight different descriptions of
the hypothetical dispute were used, constituting manipulations of the following three
experimental variables: the relationship of the participant to the other person in the
dispute (close or distant), similarity of background (similar or different), and the nature of
the disputed issue (insult vs. money). Measures of status recognition, trust in
benevolence, neutrality, voice, and procedural fairness were obtained via questionnaires.
Findings indicated that the three relational variables together consistently explained much
of the variance in the procedural justice ratings. Furthermore, procedural justice
judgments during dyadic conflict resolution were primarily shaped by assessments of
status recognition and neutrality. Trust was the strongest influence, however, when
people dealt with third parties and other authorities. Lind et al. (1997) believe that their
series of studies show evidence that voice effects are mediated by relational judgments,
which brings together the older research of Thibaut and Walker and Leventhal (with their
emphasis on procedural elements affecting justice judgments) and the newer research
focusing on the social cognitive antecedents of procedural justice.
Additional support for the relational model comes from studies that show that
procedural justice influences individuals’ self-esteem, as well as perceptions of their
standing within important reference groups. For example, in an experimental study by
Koper, Van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Vermunt, and Wilke (1993), an academic skills test
was given to subjects who had been told that the test was accurate at diagnosing their
level of skill. In the unfair treatment experimental condition, a research assistant graded
only the student’s first three answers and offered no explanation for this decision. In the
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fair treatment experimental condition, the entire test was graded very carefully. The
authors found that how subjects were treated by the research assistant significantly
influenced their self-esteem: Those who were treated fairly had significantly higher selfesteem scores than those who had been in the unfair treatment condition. According to a
relational perspective, fair treatment by authorities indicates that a person is a valuable
group member, whereas unfair treatment indicates marginality and even exclusion (Tyler
et al., 1997). It follows, therefore, that the knowledge that one is valued should increase
self-esteem, whereas the knowledge of marginality should decrease it. In another study,
Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) found that fair and respectful treatment by authorities
who represent important groups communicates feelings of respect and pride, which, in
turn, are related to self-esteem, feelings of obligation to group authorities, and the desire
to help the group beyond what is required. Research in this area has also shown that even
when the working context encourages short-term and instrumental goals, employees who
identify with the company care about fair treatment because of the self-relevant
information it communicates to them (Smith, Thomas, & Tyler, 2006).
Recently, the impact of procedural fairness on relationships with individual group
members other than the group leader has been investigated. Cornelis, Van Hiel, and De
Cremer (2006) hypothesized that even though the strongest reactions to procedural
fairness or unfairness is supposedly directed toward the source associated with the
authority enacting the procedures, it is not unlikely that reactions extend to other targets
at other levels. They provided an explicit test of the relational model of procedural
fairness by manipulating both procedural fairness and other group members’ support for
the leader and examining their effects on relationships between individual group
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members. Cornelis et al. (2006) found that when a group member indicated that he or she
did not support the leader, procedural fairness did not influence participants’ reactions
toward this other group member because the leader was not regarded as representative for
the other group member. These researchers concluded that this study provides evidence
for one of the core assumptions of the relational model- namely, that fairness matters
because authorities are regarded as representatives of the whole group.
Another recent study of the group-value model used survey data from people
attending U.S. Food and Drug Administration advisory committee meetings to examine
the extent to which procedural justice considerations predict satisfaction and outcome
acceptance (McComas, Tuite, Waks, & Sherman, 2007). Specifically, the researchers
were interested in determining whether, when facing the prospect of real or potential
conflicts of interest among advisory committee members, believing that the conflict-ofinterest procedures are just and those wielding them are trustworthy, neutral, and
respectful of one’s rights influence attendees’ satisfaction with the meetings and
acceptance of meeting outcomes. Questionnaires measured attendees’ conflict-ofinterest tolerance, procedural knowledge, perceptions of procedural fairness, relational
judgments (the group value measure that examined the degree to which an individual
viewed the procedures as neutral, the authorities as trustworthy, and treatment by the
authorities as dignified and respectful), satisfaction, and willingness to accept outcomes.
Results indicate that perceptions of procedural fairness and relational fairness
significantly influenced satisfaction with advisory committee meetings, and relational
fairness perceptions directly predicted outcome acceptance. Furthermore, when attendees
viewed meeting organizers as more trustworthy, neutral, and respectful (i.e., relational
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fairness), they were also more tolerant of real or potential conflicts of interest among
advisory committee members, more satisfied with the meetings and more willing to
accept meeting outcomes.
Extending the procedural justice framework. In general, Tyler’s work and the
supportive results of subsequent research suggest the need to extend the procedural
justice framework beyond Thibaut and Walker’s control theory. Leventhal (1980) took
the first step when he proposed a broader framework and suggested six criteria that might
influence judgments about the justice of a procedure. Tyler and his associates built upon
Leventhal’s framework when they incorporated four of his criteria- consistency, bias
suppression, accuracy, and correctability- into the neutrality dimension of their model.
In addition, although Leventhal does not frame his theory in terms of individual’s longterm connections to social groups (as does the group-value model), Leventhal’s
dimension of ethicality is similar to Tyler’s dimension of status recognition. Although
research related to the group-value model is still underway, the studies reviewed in the
previous section all seem to indicate that procedural justice judgments are strongly
affected by judgments about the quality of social relationships between individuals and
decision makers. The neutrality of those decision makers appears to be particularly
critical; Tyler’s (1989) study, for example, showed that when the issue of concern is
outcome fairness, neutrality becomes the most important variable, and Leventhal’s
consistency dimension (incorporated into Tyler’s concept of neutrality) has been found in
a number of studies (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry &
Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986) to be the major criterion used to assess procedural
justice.

Trial Consultants

53

Using the modern American courtroom as a testing ground, the present study
seeks to further explore the role that neutrality plays in perceptions of procedural justice.
Although the group-value model assumes people are concerned about their long-term
social relationships and membership in a jury typically does not involve a significant
length of time, it can be argued that people identify with a common membership when a
legal-political system is involved. “Although the legal system is a larger group than a
family, friendship, or work group, people nonetheless identify strongly with the legalpolitical system and feel a striking sense of personal obligation to legal and political
authorities” (Tyler, 1989, p. 831). In fact, a study conducted by Tyler and McGraw
(1986) found that the tendency to focus more on procedures than outcomes when
deciding what is fair is especially strong when the object of scrutiny is a system as
opposed to an individual. Research also shows that fairness is less important in settings
(such as a family) where intense positive feelings exist that hold the relationship together,
or when the participants feel no personal or financial ties and therefore care less about
whether the relationship is maintained; fairness is more important in relationships of
intermediate emotional intensity, whereby participants have no strong feelings toward
each other but still benefit from interaction (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986). The next
chapter will summarize the gaps in the literature and present the hypotheses that will be
tested in the present study.
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CHAPTER 4
Statement of the Problem and the Present Study
The preceding reviews of both the trial consulting industry and the field of
procedural justice suggest several needed directions for research. Two of the most
glaring limitations are the lack of research conducted on the perceived fairness of trial
consulting and the potential impact that trial consultants may have on the outcome of a
jury trial. As the use of a trial consultant’s services become more routine, it is important
to determine if this use can affect perceptions of procedural justice and, ultimately, juror
verdicts.
Unfortunately, there is little empirical research examining the perceived fairness
of trial consulting (Strier, 1999). One notable exception is an experimental study
conducted by Stolle et al. (1996) which was designed to address three questions regarding
observers’ judgments of fairness: 1) How will the prosecution/plaintiff’s or the
defendant’s use of a psychologist trial consultant for jury selection and trial preparation
impact the perceived fairness of trial procedures and outcomes; 2) How will differences
in the outcome of the case impact the perceived fairness of trial procedures and
outcomes; and 3) Will the impact of either trial consultant presence or outcome of
judgments on fairness generalize across cases in both civil and criminal settings. Using a
2 x 2 x 2 x2 mixed factorial design, Stolle et al. (1996) manipulated case type (withinsubjects, criminal or civil), case outcome (between-subjects, favoring either
prosecution/plaintiff or defendant), presence or absence of a trial consultant for the
prosecution/plaintiff (between-subjects), and presence or absence of a trial consultant for
the defendant (between-subjects). One hundred thirty-two undergraduate students were
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presented case summaries of both criminal and civil cases. Both case studies were
written in a manner that tilted equity in favor of the prosecution/plaintiff. The criminal
summary briefly described a homicide case tried in a Missouri court. The civil summary
was based upon a wrongful death case tried in a Texas court. In conditions involving a
trial consultant, a one paragraph description of the trial consultant’s role (assistance with
case presentation and jury selection through the distribution and analysis of a community
survey) was inserted in the summary.
Each participant was presented with a packet that included a case summary and a
questionnaire that was comprised of 21 procedural justice items measured on Likert-type
scales. In conditions where a trial consultant was used, the questionnaire also included an
additional question directly assessing the perceived fairness of the use of a consultant.
Stolle et al.’s (1996) questionnaire included items from the theoretical justice frameworks
of Thibaut and Walker (1975), Leventhal (1980), and Tyler (1989).
Using the procedural justice ratings as dependent variables, a four-way
MANOVA was conducted. Stolle et al. (1996) found significant main effects for
outcome and type of trial, and a significant interaction between the two on procedural
justice ratings. Case outcome was a major contributor to participants’ perceptions of
procedural justice. When participants were told that the jury found in favor of the
prosecution/plaintiff (which was in line with the expectations of participants due to the
fact that the case studies were written in a manner that tilted equity in favor of the
prosecution/plaintiff), they found that the procedures and the outcome were thought to be
more fair, more consistent, less biased, accurate, easier to correct, and more ethical.
With regard to the type of trial, the researchers found that although the court was
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perceived to have more control over the evidence presented in the criminal case, the
results agreed more with the expectations of the participants in the civil case.
Furthermore, the jurors in the civil case were thought to have better received and
understood the information needed to make a decision, and wrong decisions were thought
to be more easily corrected in the civil case. Stolle et al. (1996) found that participants
thought that wrong decisions were easier to correct when the outcome favored the
prosecution/plaintiff than they would be when the outcome favored the defendant, but
this difference only occurred in the civil case. Similarly, in the civil case, the rights of
the parties were perceived to be better protected when the outcome favored the
prosecution or plaintiff. The results also indicated that the court was perceived to be
more controlling of the outcome when the outcome favored the defendant than when the
outcome favored the plaintiff. In the criminal case, the court was perceived to be equally
controlling regardless of outcome.
The finding that most directly relates to the proposed study involves the impact of
the presence of trial consultants on procedural fairness. Multivariate analyses yielded no
significant main effects or interaction for the presence of a trial consultant for either the
prosecution/plaintiff or the defendant. Consequently, Stolle et al. (1996) also analyzed
the data using univariate analyses.1 They found only one main-effect for the presence of
a trial consultant: the legal authorities were perceived to have acted more ethically when
the defendant did not have a trial consultant than when the defendant did have a trial
consultant. Stolle et al. (1996) found several significant interactions, however. With

1

While some significant findings from the univariate analyses emerged, the researchers caution that “maineffects and interactions involving the presence of a consultant for the plaintiff or the defendant, which were
not significant in the MANOVA analysis, must be interpreted not as conclusive results but as information
useful in guiding future research” (p. 161).
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respect to decision control (one of the procedural justice items taken from Thibaut and
Walker’s (1975) theoretical framework), results indicated that when the defendant had a
trial consultant, the parties were seen as having more opportunity to influence the court’s
decision when the prosecution or plaintiff also had a trial consultant. However, when it
was the defendant who did not have a trial consultant, the parties were seen as having
equal opportunity to influence the decision whether or not there was a prosecution or
plaintiff trial consultant present.
One of the four items Stolle et al. (1996) used in their questionnaire to measure
consistency (one of the procedural justice dimensions taken from Leventhal’s (1976)
framework) assessed participant expectations by asking them to rate the extent to which
they believed that the results of the case agreed with their expectations. When
participants’ expectations were examined, a 4-way interaction was found such that when
the defendant alone had a trial consultant and the defendant won, the result agreed more
with participants’ expectations than either when the defendant did not have a trial
consultant or when both sides had them.
With regard to the perceived ethicality of the cases (one of the procedural justice
items taken from Leventhal (1976)), Stolle et al. (1996) found that when participants
were told that the jury had found the defendant guilty, it was perceived as more fair for
the defendant to receive the assistance of a trial consultant. When the defendant was on
the winning side, however, whether or not a trial consultant had assisted him/her did not
appear to be as highly relevant to fairness. As the researchers noted, “This pattern of
findings seems to suggest that future research should focus on the balance of the presence
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of a trial consultant between the parties, which may have an important impact on
observers’ procedural justice judgment” (p. 168).
Stolle et al. (1996) concluded that while the lack of significant multivariate effects
for the presence of trial consultants may suggest that consultant presence does not affect
judgments of procedural justice, significant univariate analyses may indicate that the
presence or absence of a trial consultant gains importance when interacting with other
independent variables, such as the presence of a trial consultant for the other party and its
interactions with case outcomes. Furthermore, Stolle et al. (1996) emphasized that
regardless of its effectiveness or legality, scientific trial consulting carries the potential to
undermine the legitimacy of legal authorities and legal proceedings if it is perceived by
the public as being a fundamentally unfair trial tactic. Once trial consulting techniques
are perceived as unfair or manipulative, both the participants and observers of a trial are
in danger of viewing the entire jury system as unfair.
In the only other known study to investigate this topic, Griffith et al. (2007) used
a more diverse public sample to explore the question of how eligible jurors view trial
consultants. A team of six researchers approached almost 4,000 individuals in the
terminals of two major metropolitan airports and outside of two shopping centers in two
states (Texas and Pennsylvania). The final sample included 1251 participants from 50
states. All respondents were juror eligible in the state in which they lived. Materials
consisted of a survey comprised of general demographic information, as well as questions
related to the use of trial consultants. Respondents were provided with a description of
some of the services that may be offered by trial consultants (e.g., jury selection, witness
preparation, trial strategy) and then asked to rate eight statements about the role of a trial
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consultant on a five-point Likert-type scale. Sample questions include “Trial consultants
bias the jury,” “Trial consulting services are a waste of money for the attorneys that hire
them,” and “Trial consultants should not be permitted in the legal system.” In addition,
each participant was asked, “If you were on a jury and found out that one side was using
a trial consultant, you would: (a) be biased in favor for the side that hired the trial
consultant, (b) be biased against the side that hired the trial consultant, or (c) not be
biased toward either side.”
A correlational analysis conducted on some of the sociodemographic variables
across the eight trial consultant questions found a distinct pattern such that those who
believed the jury system to be fair and those with a higher earned income exhibited more
favorable attitudes toward trial consultants. In addition, Anglo American respondents
were more favorable toward trial consultants on four items, and age and gender yielded
several significant associations. While the authors do point out that the significant
correlations found can be largely due to the large sample size and the variance accounted
for was minimal, Griffith et al. (2007) conclude that their results point to individual
differences regarding how potential jurors view trial consultants, and this might be an
important consideration when selecting jurors. For example, in this study individuals
who were Anglo American, earned high salaries, and believed that the judicial system
was fair had more favorable views toward trial consultants.
With regard to the question: “if you were on a jury and found out that one side
was using a trial consultant, you would…,” 18% reported that they would be biased
against the side that hired the trial consultant. Less than 0.25% reported that they would
be biased in favor of the side that used the trial consultant. Based on these findings,
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Griffith et al. (2007) recommend that trial consultants keep a low profile during legal
proceedings, not appearing at all if possible. On the other hand, if might be good trial
strategy in situations where only one side uses a trial consultant for the side without the
consultant to notify the jury of that fact at some point during the proceedings.
Although Stolle et al.’s (1996) and Griffith et al.’s (2007) research provides some
initial answers to the question of whether (and under what circumstances) the use of trial
consultants is perceived as being unfair, no studies have examined whether the use of a
trial consultant by one or more opposing parties can impact a juror’s determination of a
defendant’s guilt or innocence. We know virtually nothing about how the use of a trial
consultant may violate a juror’s sense of procedural justice. The present study explores
the question of whether the balance of trial consultants can affect a juror’s perceptions of
procedural justice and impact his or her verdict, particularly in cases where the evidence
is ambiguous. As discussed previously, research has shown that the bias tendencies of
jurors decrease when confronted with clear proof of guilt or innocence and increase when
the evidence is more ambiguous (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller,
1978). This dissertation investigates the possibility that the balance of trial consultants
can serve as a biasing factor when evidence strength is ambiguous, thus impacting a
juror’s determination of a defendant’s guilt or innocence. In this study, participants’
verdict determinations (both dichotomous and continuous) were assessed in conditions
where the presence (or absence) of a trial consultant and SOE were varied.2 For the
purposes of this study, SOE is operationalized as how strongly the evidentiary set favors
one of the parties. Unlike in Stolle et al.’s (1996) study where the evidence in the case
2

Continuous juror verdicts were also included to provide a more sensitive measure (Kaplan & Miller,
1978; Kerr et al., 1999).
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summaries was skewed in favor of the plaintiff/prosecution, the present study uses three
case summaries to examine participant response when the evidence favors the
prosecution, the defense, or is ambiguous.
As previously mentioned, Tyler (1989) identified three relational issues that
people seem to consider most when making procedural justice judgments: (1) trust,
which refers to inferences about the motivation of authorities, particularly the willingness
of authorities to consider needs and make unbiased decisions; (2) neutrality, which refers
to the belief that there is a level playing field and decisions are based on an accurate and
full assessment of the facts; and (3) status recognition, which refers to the belief that the
authority has treated the person with the respect and dignity that comes with full-fledged
group membership. The differences in procedural justice judgments that Stolle et al.
(1996) found when there was an imbalance of trial consultants among parties can be
viewed as a violation of Tyler’s (1989) principle of neutrality. Numerous studies have
found neutrality to be the major criterion used to assess procedural justice (e.g., BarrettHoward & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986;
Tyler, 1989). Drawing on the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the first
hypothesis sought to determine whether a trial was perceived as more neutral if there was
a balance of trial consultants during a trial. If both the prosecution and defense used the
services of a trial consultant, there is no violation of Tyler’s (1989) neutrality principle
(notion of a level playing field) and judgments of perceived fairness were expected to be
higher than if only one side used a trial consultant. Thus, the following main effect for
the use of a trial consultant was predicted:
Hypothesis 1: A trial will be perceived as being higher in
neutrality if both the prosecution and defense use a trial consultant
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than if only one party uses a trial consultant.
Because previous research on the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) has
assessed procedural justice using all three relational concerns, this study measured trust
and status recognition in addition to neutrality. For the purposes of this study, these three
variables were combined to form a measure referred to as global fairness. The second
hypothesis explored whether a trial was perceived as being higher in global fairness if
there was a balance of trial consultants during a trial. If both the prosecution and defense
used the services of a trial consultant, judgments of perceived fairness were expected to
be higher than if only one side used a trial consultant. Thus, the following main effect for
the use of a trial consultant was predicted:
Hypothesis 2: A trial will be perceived as being higher in global
fairness if both the prosecution and defense use a trial consultant
than if only one party uses a trial consultant.
The third hypothesis predicted a main effect for SOE that follows from the
predictable, strong positive association that the empirical research (e.g., Devine et al.,
2001) has found between SOE and jury verdicts of guilt.
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of conviction will be highest when
the evidence favors the prosecution, moderate when the evidence is
ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favors the defense.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that jurors would be the most likely to find the defendant guilty
when the evidence was in favor of the prosecution and the least likely to find the
defendant guilty when the evidence favored the defense. When SOE was ambiguous, the
likelihood of conviction would fall somewhere in between.

Trial Consultants

63

The fourth hypothesis predicted an interaction effect between the use of trial
consultants and SOE on the likelihood of conviction. Specifically, the following was
hypothesized:
Hypothesis 4: a) When the evidence strongly favors the defense,
the likelihood of conviction will be low regardless of the presence
or absence of trial consultants; b) When the evidence strongly
favors the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction will be high
regardless of the presence or absence of trial consultants; and
c) When the evidence is ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction
will be highest when the defense uses a trial consultant, moderate
when both sides use a trial consultant, and lowest when the
prosecution uses a trial consultant.
When the evidence strongly favored either the defense or prosecution, it was anticipated
that the bias tendencies of jurors would decrease (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982;
Kaplan & Miller, 1978) and jurors would reach a verdict based largely on the strength of
the evidence presented during trial. When the evidence was ambiguous, however, it was
predicted that jurors were more likely to be swayed by biasing factors, such as the
presence or absence of a trial consultant. In those conditions where the evidence was
ambiguous and the prosecution alone used a trial consultant, it was anticipated that the
likelihood of conviction would be lower than when both sides have a consultant. The
relational model (Tyler, 1989) would predict that neutrality has been violated, and jurors
will therefore perceive the prosecution as having an unfair advantage and will
compensate for this by being more likely to find in favor of the defense. It was further
predicted that the likelihood of conviction would be the highest when the evidence was
ambiguous and the defendant alone used a trial consultant. In those conditions, the
relational model (Tyler, 1989) would predict that jurors will perceive the defense as

Trial Consultants

64

having an unfair advantage, and will compensate for this by being more likely to find in
favor of the prosecution.
Another major purpose of this dissertation was to explore for the first time the
possibility that procedural justice, in the form of Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational model
of authority, mediated the relationship between the use of trial consultants and the verdict
received in criminal trials. The central premise of the relational model is that individuals
obtain information regarding their standing within important reference groups from the
way in which they interact with authorities. As previously mentioned, research has
shown that when the issue of concern is outcome fairness, neutrality becomes particularly
important (Tyler, 1989). It is often assumed that features of neutrality are built into the
framework of legal procedures. Tyler et al. (1997) pointed out that during trials, for
example, a level playing field is created by giving both sides the opportunity to have an
attorney and by giving those attorneys equal opportunities to present arguments and
question witnesses. What must be addressed is the fact that the level playing field is
violated when only one side has access to the resources and skills of a professional trial
consultant. In fact, a number of researchers have expressed concern that the basic
fairness of our justice system seems to be undermined when one side possesses
“scientific methods of persuasion” and the other side does not (Kressel & Kressel, 2002).
This study investigated whether judgments about neutrality acted as a mediator
between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts in cases where the evidence
was ambiguous. It was anticipated that when only one party has a trial consultant, juror
perceptions of fairness decrease, which subsequently causes the likeliness of a guilty
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verdict to either increase or decrease (depending on which side the inequity lies). The
following prediction was therefore advanced:
Hypothesis 5: The relationship between the balance of trial
consultants and likelihood of conviction will be mediated
by perceptions of neutrality (ambiguous evidence only).
In addition, the present study also investigated whether the relationship between
the balance of trial consultants and likelihood of conviction was mediated by judgments
about global fairness. It was predicted that the three relational concerns of trust,
neutrality, and status recognition together contribute to explaining why the use of trial
consultants may affect juror verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous.
Hypothesis 6 looked at this possibility:
Hypothesis 6: The relationship between the balance of trial
consultants and likelihood of conviction will be mediated
by perceptions of global fairness (ambiguous evidence only).
The next chapter will describe the participants, design, materials, measures and
procedures used to test the six hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 5
Method
Participants
Participants consisted of 255 jury-eligible individuals (120 females, 135 males)
recruited from the participant pool of the psychology and management departments at
Baruch College. Participation in this experiment fulfilled partial course credit. Four
additional participants took part in the study, but failed to complete all of the items in the
questionnaire and were excluded from the analyses. The ages of the participants ranged
from 18 to 37, with a mean age of 19.96 years and a standard deviation of 2.77 years.
Most subjects were White (32.9%) or Asian American/Asian (27.1%). Hispanics/Latinos
represented 20.0% of the sample, Black/African Americans represented 9.0%, selfcategorized “others” represented 7.5%, and 9 participants (3.5%) choose not to answer
this question.
Design
The study was a 3 x 3 factorial with Use of a Trial Consultant (Prosecution vs.
Defense vs. Both) and SOE (Advantage Defense vs. Ambiguous vs. Advantage
Prosecution) as between-subjects factors. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the nine possible experimental conditions. Table 1 presents a breakdown of participants
by cells.
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Table 1
Participants by Experimental Condition
Use of trial consultant
SOE

Prosecution

Defense

Both

Total

Advantage
defense

28

28

29

85

Ambiguous

28

29

30

87

Advantage
prosecution

28

27

28

83

Total

84

84

87

255

Materials
Evidence strength was manipulated by presenting participants with three different
versions of a criminal case summary. Use of a trial consultant was manipulated by
inserting a one paragraph description into each case summary that allowed the
experimenter to vary the presence of a trial consultant.
Manipulation of strength of evidence. The criminal case summaries used in this
study were based upon an aggravated sexual assault case that was tried in a Texas court.
The summaries briefly describe the facts, which involve a man by the name of Jasper
Brennan who was accused in 1987 of assaulting and raping a 45 year-old woman in her
home.3 Jasper Brennan was charged with the crime after the victim positively identified

3

Case summaries were based on the trial of Brandon Moon. Retrieved January 7, 2005, from
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=162. The names and many of the facts
were altered for the purpose of providing a brief and straightforward summary of the relevant
circumstances of the case.
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him in police photographs and a live lineup. Two other victims who had been attacked in
a similar fashion also positively identified Jasper Brennan during the live lineup.
By varying some of the facts presented as well as the presence and testimony of
witnesses, three versions of the case summary were created: The Ambiguous Evidence
condition, the Advantage Prosecution condition, and the Advantage Defense condition
(See Appendix A). The Ambiguous Evidence condition was written so that the evidence
against the defendant is substantial but not conclusive. The summary states the facts of
the crime and then describes how the victim was called into the police station within the
next few days to assist in creating a composite sketch of the perpetrator, to look at
photographs of potential suspects, and to view a live lineup in the hopes of identifying
her attacker. The summary in the Ambiguous Evidence condition states that the victim
identified Jasper Brennan as her assailant, but that she could not be certain. Brennan, a
college sophomore, was arrested and charged with three counts of aggravated sexual
assault. During the trial, the victim testified that she was very confident in her ability to
clearly recall details of her attacker, but was then forced to admit that she did not know
certain facts, such as whether or not he had a moustache.
The Ambiguous Evidence condition also includes testimony from the serologist
assigned to the case. The serologist testified that the semen found on the bedding was
produced by a non-secretor, and therefore Jasper Brennan (a non-secretor) was a possible
contributor. Semen samples from the victim’s husband and son were not obtained. The
serologist also testified upon cross-examination that no sperm samples were retrieved
from the other two victims. The defense produced two witnesses that corroborated
Brennan’s alibi: Brennan’s girlfriend, who claimed to have called him on the telephone
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at his home less than an hour before the crime occurred and then saw him in the campus
library shortly after the crime occurred, and a second witness who testified that he had
seen Jasper Brennan studying in the campus library right before the crime occurred.
Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did
not have an opportunity to commit the rape.
In the Advantage Prosecution condition, the case summary was manipulated to
create evidence favorable to the prosecution. This time, for example, when the victim is
called into the police station in the week following the attack, she immediately picked out
the picture of Jasper Brennan and declared that he looked exactly like the perpetrator.
Two other victims of similar crimes also identified Brennan in the lineup. During the
trial, the victim testified that due to the ample light in her bedroom, she was very
confident in her ability to clearly recall details of her attacker. She also testified that as
soon as she saw Jasper Brennan in both the photographs at the police station and in the
live lineup, she knew that he was the man who had raped her.
The Advantage Prosecution condition also alters the testimony from the serologist
assigned to the case. The serologist testified that a blood sample taken from Jasper
Brennan put him among just five percent of the population who could possibly have been
the source of the semen stains. Furthermore, the semen could not have belonged to the
victim’s husband or son. The defense produced only one witness, a girlfriend who
admitted during cross-examination that she has a car that the defendant drove on
occasion.
Lastly, in the Advantage Defense condition, the case summary was manipulated to
create evidence favorable to the defense. In this condition, the victim was not asked to
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return to the police station to view photographs of potential suspects until five months
after the crime occurred. Although she identified Jasper Brennan as a possible suspect,
the case summary states that he was the only blue-eyed white male in the police
photographs. The live lineup was also conducted five months after the crime occurred.
The summary states that Brennan was again the only blue-eyed white male, as well as the
only person the police had placed in both the photographs and live lineup. During the
trial, the victim testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember details of
her attacker, and yet was forced to admit during questioning that this was untrue (for
example, she could not recall his eye color).
The Advantage Defense condition also alters the testimony from the serologist,
stating that Jasper Brennan, as well as the victim’s husband and son, was a possible
contributor of the semen. Furthermore, the summary introduces more doubt into the
prosecution’s case by stating that the serologist admitted that forensic tests had shown
that all other trace evidence analysis found at the crime scene, including pubic hairs,
excluded Jasper Brennan as a source. The defense witnesses and alibis were the same as
in the Ambiguous Evidence condition: a girlfriend and co-student who testified that they
saw Brennan in the library around the time that the crime was committed.
Manipulation of use of a trial consultant. The second manipulation in this study
was a one paragraph description that was inserted into each case summary to allow the
experimenter to vary the presence of a trial consultant. There were three different
paragraphs reflecting the three possible experimental conditions for this variable (See
Appendix B). In those conditions when only the defense used a trial consultant, the
paragraph described how the defense hired a consultant to help with jury selection and

Trial Consultants

71

case presentation. It detailed how the consultant paid citizens to complete a survey, and
how important information gleaned from this survey was passed along to the defense who
used this information when planning case strategy and selecting a jury. The paragraph
also gave a brief description of a mock trial that was conducted and the benefits this
afforded the defense in preparing for trial.
In those conditions when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, the identical
paragraph was inserted, except the word “defense” was replaced with “prosecution.” The
third paragraph was inserted for those participants assigned to the condition where both
the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant. The paragraph in this condition
begins by stating that both the defense and prosecution hired consultants to help with jury
selection and case presentation. It then goes on to describe the assistance provided by
trial consultants for both sides in the same language used in the first two paragraphs. The
total summary (including inserted paragraph) was approximately two single spaced typed
pages in length.
Measures
Procedural justice. Neutrality, trust, and status recognition (Tyler, 1989) were
assessed using the Relational Theory measure, which was a questionnaire that consisted
of 14 procedural justice items adapted from questionnaires used by Tyler (1989) and
Stolle et al. (1996) (see Appendix D for a list of questionnaire items). Together, these
three variables comprised the global fairness dimension of this study (Hypotheses 2 and
6). Below is a detailed description of the variables that were measured and how the
neutrality and global fairness scores were calculated.
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Neutrality. As in previous research (e.g., Tyler, 1989; Tyler, 1994b), neutrality
was operationalized for the purposes of this study as (a) proper behavior, (b) factual
decision making, and (c) a lack of bias. Questions 1-9 were combined to form a
neutrality scale that measured participants’ perceptions of neutrality (Hypotheses 1 and
5). The neutrality questionnaire was modeled after Tyler (1989), who created subscales
to reflect each of the three dimensions of neutrality.
The first subscale, impropriety of behavior (Tyler [1989] labels “proper behavior”
as such), was measured with four items (see Appendix D). Participants rated each
statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly
disagree” (7). Open-ended questions (e.g., “If you thought the use of a trial consultant
was dishonest or improper, please explain briefly in the space below”) were used to
supplement Likert-type responses for each item in order to provide a greater depth of
opinion. One exception to this was the second item, whereby participants were asked, “If
you thought the witness did something dishonest or improper, please explain briefly in
the space below.” This question was really serving as a decoy. Because the researcher
did not want participants to know the true focus of the study, this open-ended question
was inserted into the questionnaire between questions asking for more information about
perceived impropriety on the part of either the attorneys or trial consultants. The
impropriety of behavior subscale score was calculated by summing the ratings of these
four items, with a high score indicating a high level of improper behavior. The internal
consistency reliability (coefficient !) for the score on the impropriety of behavior
subscale in the current study was .60, which did not meet the criterion of .70 that had
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been set for the minimally acceptable level of internal consistency (Nunnally, 1978). 4
The removal of the fourth item increased the coefficient ! for the subscale score to .67,
so for the current study the subscale score for impropriety of behavior was recalculated
after eliminating item four. Item four was also removed from all subsequent calculations.
The second subscale, factual decision making, was assessed by two items (Tyler,
1989). (See Appendix D.) Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale,
ranging from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7). An open-ended question
(“If you thought the jury was not given all of the information needed to render a verdict,
please explain briefly in the space below what information you thought was missing”)
was used to provide a greater depth of opinion. The factual decision making subscale
score was calculated by summing the ratings of these two items, with a high score
indicating a high level factual decision making. The coefficient ! for the score on the
subscale was .71.
Lack of bias, the third subscale, was measured by three items (see Appendix D).
Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree”
(1) to “strongly disagree” (7). An open-ended question (“If you thought the legal
authorities involved favored one party over another, please explain briefly in the space
below”) was used to provide a greater depth of opinion. The lack of bias subscale score
was calculated by summing the ratings of these three items, with a high score indicating
less bias. The coefficient ! for the subscale score was .76.
A neutrality scale score was calculated for each participant by reverse scoring the
negative subscale items (items 5 and 6) and then summing the ratings of the eight
4

This was not unexpectedly low, however, as Tyler’s (1989) study had found an alpha level of .61 for the
same subscale.
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procedural justice items discussed above, with a high score indicating a high level of
neutrality. Neutrality was calculated in this way to better reflect the method used by
many researchers when developing a total score for a scale that is comprised of multiple
subscales (e.g., Minnesota Job Satisfaction Questionnaire (MSQ), 1967; Job Satisfaction
Survey (JSS), Spector, 1985; Self-Compassion Scale, Neff, 2003). The coefficient ! for
the score on the neutrality scale was .75.
Trust. For the purposes of this study, trust was operationalized as the
trustworthiness of the motives of the jury system. Since trust involves the belief that
third parties desire to treat people in ways that are fair and reasonable (Tyler, 1989), this
dimension was assessed using a 2-item scale modeled after Tyler (1989). (See Appendix
D.) Participants rated each statement on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly
agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (7). The trust scale was calculated by summing the
ratings of these two items, with a high score indicating a high level of trust. The
coefficient ! for the score on the trust scale was .85.
Status recognition. The third relational concern, status recognition, was
operationalized as politeness, treatment with dignity, and respect for rights due to each
group member. Status recognition was assessed using a 3-item scale modeled after Tyler
(1989). (See Appendix D.) The status recognition scale was calculated by summing the
ratings of these three items, with a high score indicating a high level of status recognition.
The coefficient ! for the score on the status recognition scale was .89.
Global fairness. A global fairness score was calculated for each participant by
reverse scoring the negative subscale items (items 5, 6, 10, and 11) and then summing the
ratings of the 13 remaining procedural justice items in the Relational Theory measure,
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with a high score indicating a high level of global fairness. The coefficient ! for global
fairness was .85.
Table 2 presents a summary of the Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities for all scores on
the subscales and scales. With the exception of the impropriety of behavior subscale, all
subscales and scales meet the criterion for the acceptable level of internal consistency
(Nunnally, 1978).
Table 2
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliabilities for Scores on Scales and Subscales
Scale

Number of items

Neutrality

Cronbach’s Alpha

8

.75

Impropriety of behavior

3

.67

Factual decision making

2

.71

Lack of bias

3

.76

Trust

2

.85

Status recognition

3

.89

Global fairness

13

.85

Likelihood of conviction. The second measure of the questionnaire (see Appendix
E) assessed participants’ likelihood of convicting the defendant (Hypotheses 3 and 4).
Both dichotomous (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty) and continuous (e.g., rating confidence in
the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt) verdict determinations were measured in an effort
to tap both proportional and mean differences in guilt ratings. Question 1 of this measure
asked participants to make a dichotomous determination of the defendant’s guilt (guilty
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or not guilty). Question 2 asked participants to make a continuous determination of
Jasper Brennan’s guilt on a scale from 1 to 7 (e.g., 1 is “I am positive Brennan is not
guilty” and 7 is “I am positive Brennan is guilty”). Hypotheses 3 and 4 were each tested
twice: once using the dichotomous verdict measure from Question 1, and then again
using the continuous verdict measure from Question 2. In order to get a better sense of
the factors influencing their decision, Question 3 asked participants to identify which (if
any) factors influenced their determination of guilt or innocence. Answers from
Question 3 were not used to test the hypotheses, but rather provided exploratory
qualitative data. Question 4 asked participants who answered “guilty” to Question 1 to
recommend a prison term between 5 and 20 years or more. 5 Question 4 was also
included for exploratory purposes.6
Manipulation checks. Additional items were included at the end of the
questionnaire in order to ensure that the experimenter achieved the desired experimental
SOE conditions (Ambiguous Evidence condition, Advantage Prosecution condition, and
Advantage Defense condition). Questions 5 and 6 (see Appendix E) asked participants to
separately rate the strength of both the defense and prosecution’s evidence (taking into
account factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 (very weak) to 7
(very strong). Question 7 asked participants to rate the strength of the evidence on a
scale from 1 (the evidence strongly favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly
favored the prosecution). To check on the manipulation of the use of a trial consultant,
Question 8 asked participants which party (or parties) received assistance from a trial
consultant.
5

Questions 1, 2, and 4 were based on similar items used by Kerr et al., 1999.
Although no formal predictions were made, it was expected that as perceptions of fairness increased,
recommended jail terms would lengthen.
6
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Demographic and background information. The last measure, Demographic and
Background Information, was collected in order to determine if there were differences in
the results based on age, gender, or ethnic origin (See Appendix F). Participants were
also asked if they or anyone they are close to have ever been the victim of a violent
crime, and/or if they or anyone they are close to have ever been accused of a violent
crime. This information was analyzed to determine if the results of those participants
who answered affirmatively to either of those questions differed significantly from the
results of other participants.
Procedures
The participants were told that the researcher was studying how people make use
of partial or “summary trials,” a quicker and less expensive alternative to conducting full
trials, that are being used more frequently in some states (e.g., New Jersey). No oral
evidence is given in summary trials; instead, evidence is presented to the judge in the
form of written affidavits. Although judgments in summary trials are not binding, they
often lead to negotiated settlements prior to jury trials (Cooper & Neuhaus, 2000).
Participants were told that the researcher’s interest was in understanding how jurors make
decisions in these summary trials. Informed consent was obtained from all student
participants. Although participants were informed at the time of signing up through the
on-line Participant Pool that the material in this study involved a rape trial, they were
reminded again before the experiment began and given an opportunity to withdraw
without penalty at that time if uncomfortable.
The condition received by each participant was randomly assigned. Each
participant received a packet containing one criminal case summary and a questionnaire
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comprised of the four measures discussed above. Participants were instructed to read one
of the nine sets of materials as if they were a potential juror, paying close attention to the
facts of the case and the arguments presented by both parties. Next, participants were
instructed to read standard judge’s instructions, which included a description of the
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof (see Appendix C).
Participants were asked to work through the questionnaire packet in the order in which
the materials were presented, beginning with the Relational Theory measure (see
Appendix D), followed by the Likelihood of Conviction measure and Manipulation
Check items (see Appendix E), and concluding with the demographic form (see
Appendix F). Participants were given one hour to complete the experiment.

Trial Consultants

79

CHAPTER 6
Pretest of Materials: The Pilot Study
To ensure that subjects were distinguishing among the three evidentiary
conditions as well as noticing the use of a trial consultant, a pilot study was conducted on
a separate group of participants who were randomly assigned to one of the nine
conditions. This chapter begins with basic descriptive statistics that describe the sample,
followed by the results of the manipulation checks.
Descriptive Statistics
Participants consisted of 50 jury-eligible individuals (25 females, 25 males) who
were personal acquaintances of the experimenter (n = 25) or recruited from the
participant pool of the psychology and management departments at Baruch College (n =
25). For the participant pool participants, partaking in this experiment fulfilled partial
course credit at Baruch College.
For the pilot sample of 50 individuals, the ages of the participants ranged from 18
to 64, with a mean age of 24.36 years and a standard deviation of 10.77 years. Eighteen
subjects (36%) were White, 18 (36.0%) were Asian American/Asian, 6 (12.0%) were
Hispanic/Latino, 5 (10.0%) were Black/African American, and 3 (6.0%) were Native
American. Forty-eight subjects indicated that they had not been victims of violent crimes
and two subjects chose not to answer this question. Five subjects (10.0%) indicated that
someone they are close to has been the victim of a violent crime, and 43 did not. Again,
two subjects chose not to answer this question. Forty-eight subjects indicated that they
have never been accused of committing a violent crime, and two subjects did not respond
to this question. Three subjects (6.0%) indicated that someone they are close to was
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accused of a violent crime, and 45 did not. Two subjects did not respond. Given the high
number of participants who indicated that neither they nor someone they are close to had
been the victim of a violent crime or accused of committing a violent crime, no
participants were excluded from the analyses.
Manipulation Checks
The two manipulation checks examined in this study are strength of evidence
(SOE) and use of a trial consultant. The findings on these manipulation checks are
presented next.
SOE. The first manipulation check focuses on the SOE manipulation. The
relationship between the SOE condition presented in the case and the participants ratings
of the strength of evidence presented in the trial on a scale from 1 (the evidence strongly
favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly favored the prosecution), where 4 was
inconclusive (favored both parties equally) was examined. This item is Question 7 of the
LCM. A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant relationship between
the strength of evidence presented in the case and the participants’ rating of the strength
of the evidence presented in the trial, F (2, 47) = 15.68, p = .001, partial "! = .40. The
partial eta-squared indicated a large effect size. Follow-up tests were conducted to
evaluate pairwise differences among the means. Simple planned contrasts indicated
significant differences in the means between the ambiguous condition (M = 4.11, SD =
1.19) and the means in both the “favors prosecution” (M = 5.44, SD = 1.59) and “favors
defense” conditions (M = 2.67, SD = 1.34), p < .05. This pattern of findings indicates
that the manipulation successfully moved the means in both directions. Participants in
the ambiguous condition tended to give ratings that indicated that the evidence was either
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weak or inconclusive. Those whose case favored the prosecution tended to give ratings
that favored the prosecution and not the defense, and those whose case favored the
defense tended to give ratings that favored the defense and not the prosecution.
Use of a trial consultant. The second manipulation check focuses on the use of a
trial consultant manipulation. To examine this manipulation, participant ratings of the
use of a trial consultant were measured using Question 8 of the LCM. This manipulation
check focused on the relationship between participants’ ability to distinguish, among the
cases, which parties had used a trial consultant (either the prosecution, the defense, or
both) and the actual use of trial consultants in the trial. A chi-square analysis was used to
examine this relationship. For use of a trial consultant, prosecution was coded 1, defense
was coded 2, and both were coded 3. A significant relationship was found between the
participants’ ability to distinguish which party had used a trial consultant in the case and
the actual use of trial consultants in the case, x2(4, N=50) = 54.18, p=.001, V = .73. See
Table 3 for a breakdown of the proportion of participants who identified the use of a trial
consultant in each condition.
Table 3
Proportion of Participants Identifying Use of Trial Consultants Per Condition (Pilot)
Reported use
of trial consultant

Actual use of trial consultant
Prosecution

Defense

Both

Prosecution

.87

.15

.13

Defense

.0

.80

.07

Both

.13

.05

.80

Trial Consultants
Taken together, the results indicate that the use of a trial consultant was in general
successfully manipulated in the study.
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CHAPTER 7
Results
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the empirical study. First,
the results of the study are described, beginning with basic descriptive statistics that
describe the sample. Manipulation checks are then presented, followed by the results of
hypothesis testing. Hypotheses were primarily tested through a series of analysis of
variance (ANOVA), logistic regression, chi-square, and correlation tests. For all
comparisons, p < .05 was adopted as the criterion for establishing statistical significance.
In addition, judgments regarding the magnitude of effect size follow Cohen’s (1988)
suggestions for “small,” “medium,” and “large” effect sizes. The chapter concludes with
a look at the responses to the open ended questions that were asked throughout the
questionnaire.
The Present Study
Descriptive Statistics
Several data checks were conducted on the 255 participants in the sample to
determine if the demographics had an impact on key variables in this study. They are
listed below. For other details on the sample, please refer to the “Participants” section of
Chapter 5.
Age. A t-test was conducted to determine if a relationship exists between age and
verdict. The mean age of individuals who chose guilty did not differ significantly from
the mean age of individuals who chose not guilty, t (252) = .95, ns, d = .12. In addition,
Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between age and the ratings for neutrality
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and global fairness. No significant relationships were found in either case (neutrality, r =
-.07, ns; global fairness, r = -.07, ns).
Gender. A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if a relationship
exists between gender and verdict. No significant results were found, x2(1, N=254) =
1.17, ns, V = .06. In addition, t-tests were conducted to determine if female and male
subjects differed on ratings of neutrality and global fairness. No significant differences
were found between females and males on neutrality ratings, t (253) = -.64, ns, d = .07 or
on global fairness ratings, t (253) = -.48, ns, d = .05.
Ethnicity. A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if a relationship
exists between ethnicity and verdict. No significant results were found, x2(5, N=255) =
2.94, ns, V = .10. In addition, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine if
significant differences exist between the ethnicities on ratings of neutrality and global
fairness. No significant differences were found between the ethnicities on neutrality
ratings, F (5, 249) = 1.54, ns, partial "! = .03 or global fairness ratings, F (5, 249) = 1.60,
ns, partial "! = .03.
Experiences. Multiple analyses were conducted to determine if relationships
existed between variables based on the participants’ personal experiences with violent
crimes or the experiences that close friends or family members have had with violent
crimes. Participants were compared on questions 1 through 14 of the Relational Theory
Measure (RTM), verdict determination, and scores on the neutrality and global fairness
scales. There were almost no significant differences in participant responses between
those participants who indicated that they had close friends or family members who had
experienced violent crimes (n = 56) or were accused of committing a violent crime (n =
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28) and those who had not. While there were a few significant differences in participant
responses between those participants who indicated that they had personally been the
victim of a violent crime (n = 17) or had personally been accused of committing a violent
crime (n = 4) and those who had not, these results can be attributed to chance or a small
sample size. The decision was therefore made not to exclude any participants based on
the responses to the demographic variables. Thus, all manipulation checks presented
below were conducted on the total sample (N = 255).
Manipulation Checks
As noted in the pilot study, the two manipulation checks examined in this study
are SOE and use of a trial consultant. The findings on these manipulation checks are
presented next.
SOE. The first manipulation check focuses on the SOE manipulation. The
relationship between the SOE condition presented in the case and the participants ratings
of the strength of evidence presented in the trial on a scale from 1 (the evidence strongly
favored the defense) to 7 (the evidence strongly favored the prosecution), where 4 was
inconclusive (favored both parties equally) was examined. This item is Question 7 of the
LCM. A one-way ANOVA indicated that there was a significant relationship between
the strength of evidence presented in the case and the participants’ rating of the strength
of the evidence presented in the trial, F (2,252) = 57.03, p = .001, partial "! = .31. The
partial eta-squared indicated a large effect size. Follow-up tests were conducted to
evaluate pairwise differences among the means. Simple planned contrasts indicated
significant differences in the means between the ambiguous condition (M = 3.87, SD =
1.57) and the means in both the “favors prosecution” (M = 5.33, SD = 1.27) and “favors
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defense” conditions (M = 3.09, SD = 1.25), p < .001. This pattern of findings indicates
that the manipulation successfully moved the means in both directions. Those in the
ambiguous condition tended to give ratings that indicated that the evidence was either
weak or inconclusive. Participants whose case favored the prosecution tended to give
ratings that favored the prosecution and not the defense, and participants whose case
favored the defense tended to give ratings that favored the defense and not the
prosecution. These results closely match what had been found in the pilot study
discussed earlier.
Use of a trial consultant. The second manipulation check focuses on the use of a
trial consultant manipulation. To examine this manipulation, participant ratings of the
use of a trial consultant were measured using Question 8 of the LCM, just as had been
done in the pilot study described earlier. This manipulation check focused on the
relationship between participants’ ability to distinguish, among the cases, which parties
had used a trial consultant (either the prosecution, the defense, or both) and the actual use
of trial consultants in the trial. A chi-square analysis was used to examine this
relationship. For use of a trial consultant, prosecution was coded 1, defense was coded 2,
and both were coded 3. A statistically significant and strong association was found
between the participants’ ability to distinguish which party had used a trial consultant in
the case and the actual use of trial consultants in the case, x2(4, N=255) = 195.78, p=.001,
V = .61. See Table 4 for a breakdown of the proportion of participants who identified the
use of a trial consultant in each condition.
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Table 4
Proportion of Participants Identifying Use of Trial Consultants Per Condition
Reported use
of trial consultant

Actual use of trial consultant
Prosecution

Defense

Both

Prosecution

.77

.13

.13

Defense

.10

.68

.09

Both

.13

.19

.78

The results indicate that the use of a trial consultant was in general successfully
manipulated in the study.
Hypothesis Tests
Hypotheses regarding the effects of the balance of trial consultants on perceptions
of neutrality and global fairness (Hypotheses 1 and 2) were tested through Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA). ANOVA tests consisted of an overall test of differences in group
means along with planned contrasts corresponding to the hypotheses. If the overall F test
was significant, then post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test were conducted to
further explore significant differences in group means. The effect of SOE on the
likelihood of conviction (Hypothesis 3) and the impact that SOE and balance of trial
consultants have on the likelihood of conviction (Hypothesis 4) were tested using logistic
regression analysis (for dichotomous verdict measures) and ANOVA (for continuous
verdict measures).
Hypothesis 1. A main effect for the use of a trial consultant was predicted, such
that perceptions of neutrality were expected to be higher when both the prosecution and
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defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant. A oneway ANOVA indicated that the neutrality scores of participants did not differ
significantly as a function of the balance of trial consultants between parties, F (2, 252) =
2.78, p = .06, partial "! = .02. Because the results approached significance, post hoc
comparisons using Tukey’s HSD were conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among
the means. No significant differences between the three conditions were found. The
difference between the neutrality measure when both sides used a trial consultant (M =
4.99, SD = .99) and when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.65, SD =
1.14) approached significance (p = .08). Comparisons between the neutrality measure
when the defense alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.97, SD = 1.01) and the other two
conditions were not statistically significant at p < .05 (nor did they approach
significance).
Because Tukey results indicated that the defense only use of trial consultants was
perceived as equally neutral as when both sides used a trial consultant, a planned contrast
ANOVA was conducted collapsing across these two conditions and comparing it to the
condition where the prosecution alone used a trial consultant. Results indicated a
significant difference between the neutrality score of participants when the prosecution
alone used a trial consultant when compared to the neutrality scores of participants in the
other two collapsed conditions, F (1, 253) = 5.54, p = .02, partial "! = .02. In addition, a
planned contrast ANOVA was conducted collapsing across the conditions where the
prosecution only and both sides used a trial consultant and comparing it to the condition
where the defense alone used a trial consultant. No significant difference was found, F
(1, 253) = .69, p = .40, partial "! = .01. Overall, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.
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Hypothesis 2. A main effect for the use of a trial consultant was predicted, such
that perceptions of global fairness were expected to be higher when both the prosecution
and defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant. A
one-way ANOVA indicated that there were significant differences in perceptions of
global fairness when the prosecution, the defense, or both used a trial consultant, F (2,
252) = 4.21, p = .02, partial "! = .03. The partial eta-squared indicated a small effect
size. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three conditions indicated that perceptions of
global fairness were lowest when the prosecution only used a trial consultant. When the
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, the mean global fairness measure was
significantly lower (M = 4.57, SD = 1.03) than the mean global fairness measure when
both parties used a trial consultant (M = 4.96, SD = .89), p = .02, thus supporting
Hypothesis 2. Comparisons between the mean global fairness measure when the defense
alone used a trial consultant (M = 4.91, SD = .96) and the other two conditions were not
statistically significant at p < .05. This finding did not support Hypothesis 2, which
predicted that perceptions of global fairness would be higher when both the prosecution
and defense used a trial consultant than when only one side used a trial consultant.
Because Tukey results indicated that the defense only use of trial consultants was
perceived as equally fair as when both sides used a trial consultant, a planned contrast
ANOVA was conducted collapsing across these two conditions and comparing it to the
condition where the prosecution alone used a trial consultant. Results indicated a
significant difference between the global fairness score of participants when the
prosecution alone used a trial consultant when compared to the global fairness scores of
participants in the other two collapsed conditions, F (1, 253) = 8.31, p = .01, partial "! =
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.03. In addition, a planned contrast ANOVA was conducted collapsing across the
conditions where the prosecution only and both sides used a trial consultant and
comparing it to the condition where the defense alone used a trial consultant. No
significant difference was found, F (1, 253) = .84, p = .36, partial "! = .01. Overall,
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Results indicated that perceptions of global
fairness were significantly higher when both the prosecution and defense used a trial
consultant than when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, but that perceptions of
global fairness were not significantly higher when both sides used a trial consultant if it
was the defense alone using a trial consultant.
Hypothesis 3. A main effect for SOE was predicted, such that the likelihood of
conviction was expected to be highest when the evidence favored the prosecution,
moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favored the
defense. This hypothesis was tested in two different ways. In the first analysis,
participants’ dichotomous verdict measure (guilty vs. not guilty) was used as the
likelihood of conviction measure. A logistic regression analysis indicated a significant
relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction. Table 5 presents a summary of
the logistic regression analysis. Dummy codes were used to code the predictors such that
the first variable listed in Table 5, SOE advantage prosecution, represents “advantage
prosecution vs. everyone else,” and the second variable listed, SOE advantage defense,
represents “advantage defense vs. everyone else.” The constant represents the condition
where SOE is ambiguous.
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Table 5
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for SOE Predicting Likelihood of Conviction
(N = 255)
Predictor

!

SE !

Wald’s
X!

Exp (!)

SOE advantage
prosecution

1.84**

.35

28.45

6.32

SOE advantage
defense

-.99*

.45

4.77

.37

-1.28**

.26

24.14

.28

Constant
X!

64.28**

Df

2

Note. Likelihood of conviction predictors coded as 1 for guilty and 0 for not guilty.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
Nagelkerke R" for the overall prediction model was .31, which suggests that SOE
contributed an estimated 31% of the variance in likelihood of conviction scores among
participants. The odds ratio indicates that if SOE favored the defense, participants were
37% less likely to convict the defendant than if SOE was ambiguous (p < .01). The odds
were six times greater that a participant in the condition where SOE favored the
prosecution would convict the defendant than a participant in the condition where SOE
was ambiguous (p <.001). The overall classification accuracy was 77.6%, which is better
than the proportional by chance accuracy rate which was calculated to be .57. Table 6
presents the classification outcome table of observed versus predicted results for
likelihood of conviction.
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Table 6
Classification Outcome Table of Observed Versus Predicted Results for Likelihood of
Conviction
Observed

Not Guilty
Guilty
Note. The cut value is .50

Predicted
_____________________________
Not Guilty
Guilty
145

30

27

53

Table 7 presents a breakdown of the proportion of verdicts per experimental
condition.
Table 7
Proportion of Verdicts Per Condition (N = 255)
SOE

Verdict
_____________________________
Not Guilty
Guilty

Advantage defense

.91

.09

Ambiguous

.78

.22

Advantage prosecution

.36

.64

As Table 7 shows, when the evidence was clearly presented to participants as either
favoring one side or another, participants tended to provide a verdict as expected.
What was unexpected, however, was the small difference in the proportion of “not
guilty” verdict determinations for those participants whose evidence favored the defense
(.91) and those participants whose evidence was ambiguous (.78). Twenty-two percent
of the 87 participants whose case was ambiguous chose guilty, while 78% of the
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participants whose case was ambiguous chose not guilty. A relatively even split between
guilty and non-guilty verdicts had been expected in the ambiguous evidence condition.
In the second analysis, participants’ continuous verdict measure (on a scale from
1 to 7 where 1 was “I am positive Brennan is not guilty” and 7 was “I am positive
Brennan is guilty”) was used as the likelihood of conviction measure. Analysis of
variance indicated that there was a significant relationship between the verdict chosen
and the strength of evidence, F (2, 252) = 59.67, p = .001, partial "! = .32. Tukey posthoc comparisons of the three conditions indicated results similar to the first analysis. The
likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence favored the prosecution (M = 5.20, SD
=1.75) was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence
was ambiguous (M = 3.54, SD =1.77), p = .001 or when the evidence favored the defense
(M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001. In addition, the likelihood of conviction mean when the
evidence was ambiguous was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean
when the evidence favored the defense (M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001.
Overall, Hypothesis 3 was supported. Results indicated that the likelihood of
conviction for both dichotomous and continuous verdict measures was highest when the
evidence favored the prosecution, moderate when the evidence was ambiguous, and
lowest when the evidence favored the defense. When the evidence was clearly presented
to participants as either favoring the prosecution or defense, participants tended to
provide a verdict as expected. However, when those participants in the ambiguous
evidence condition were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision, the expected even
split between guilty and non-guilty verdicts was not found. Rather, many more
participants chose a non-guilty verdict.
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Hypothesis 4. It was predicted that likelihood of conviction would be impacted
by an interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants. More specifically, it
was expected that (a) the likelihood of conviction would be low regardless of the
presence or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the defense,
and (b) the likelihood of conviction would be high regardless of the presence or absence
of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the prosecution. When the
evidence was ambiguous, however, it was expected that (c) the likelihood of conviction
would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when both sides
used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant. This
hypothesis was tested using both the dichotomous and continuous verdict measures. In
the first analysis, participants’ dichotomous verdict measure (guilty vs. not guilty) was
used as the likelihood of conviction measure. A logistic regression analysis indicated no
significant interaction between SOE and balance of trial consultants. Table 8 presents a
summary of the logistic regression analysis. Two separate dummy coded variables were
created for both SOE and use of a trial consultant in order to look at the main effects for
these variables. The predictors were coded such that the first variable listed in Table 8,
SOE advantage prosecution, represents “favors prosecution vs. everyone else,” and the
second variable listed, SOE advantage defense, represents “favors defense vs. everyone
else.” The third variable listed, TC prosecution, represents “use of TC by prosecution vs.
everyone else,” and the fourth variable listed, TC defense, represents “use of TC by
defense vs. everyone else.” The last four variables are the interactions terms, which
represent the product of all of the dummy code combinations. Thus, the fifth variable
listed, Interaction 1, represents SOE favors defense X TC defense. The sixth variable
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listed, Interaction 2, represents SOE favors prosecution X TC prosecution. The seventh
variable listed, Interaction 3, represents SOE favors defense X TC prosecution, and the
eighth variable listed, Interaction 4, represents SOE favors prosecution X TC defense.
Since the constant represents the condition where all of the predictor variables equal zero
and zero is not a realistic value for the variables to take, it is not valuable to interpret it in
this instance.
Table 8
Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for SOE/TC Interaction Predicting Likelihood
of Conviction (N = 255)
Predictor

!

SE !

Wald’s
X!

Exp (!)

SOE advantage
prosecution

-2.02**

.60

11.39

.13

SOE advantage
defense

1.94

1.11

3.04

7.00

TC prosecution

1.22

1.41

.74

3.38

TC defense

.30

.74

.16

1.35

Interaction 1

-.31

1.39

.05

.73

Interaction 2

.58

.84

.48

1.79

Interaction 3

-1.71

1.30

1.74

.18

Interaction 4

.01

.84

.00

1.01

-1.30

1.18

1.22

.27

Constant
X!
Df

69.59**
8

Note. Likelihood of conviction predictors coded as 1 for guilty and 0 for not guilty.
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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Nagelkerke R" for the overall prediction model was .33, which suggests that the
interaction between SOE and the balance of trial consultants contributed an estimated
33% of the variance in likelihood of conviction scores among participants. This is almost
the same percentage of variance predicted by SOE alone, as indicated by the results
reported for Hypothesis 3. The odds ratios for all of the interaction variables indicate that
the likelihood of conviction was not impacted by an interaction between SOE and
balance of trial consultants. The overall classification accuracy was 77.6%, which is
better than the proportional by chance accuracy rate which was calculated to be .57. This
was, however, the same classification accuracy reported for Hypothesis 3, suggesting that
the interaction variables added nothing to the model.
Table 9 presents a breakdown of the proportion of verdicts per experimental
condition.
Table 9
Proportion of Verdicts Per All Conditions (N = 255)
SOE

Use of trial consultant
____________________________________________
Prosecution
Defense
Both
Guilty Not guilty

Guilty Not guilty

Guilty Not guilty

Advantage defense

.18

.82

.07

.93

.03

.97

Ambiguous

.21

.79

.24

.76

.20

.80

Advantage prosecution

.54

.46

.74

.26

.64

.36

As Table 9 shows, when the evidence favored the defense, participants tended to provide
a not guilty verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants. When the evidence favored
the prosecution, however, Hypothesis 4 predicted that participants would provide a guilty
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verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants. While the majority of participants in this
condition did convict the defendant, the effect was not as strong as had been anticipated.
For example, when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant, only 54% of participants
in the condition where SOE favors prosecution voted to convict the defendant. Finally,
Table 9 shows that when SOE was ambiguous, participants tended to provide a not guilty
verdict regardless of the use of trial consultants.
In the second analysis, participants’ continuous verdict measure (on a scale from
1 to 7 where 1 was “I am positive Brennan is not guilty” and 7 was “I am positive
Brennan is guilty”) was used as the likelihood of conviction measure. Analysis of
variance indicated that there was a significant difference between the verdict chosen and
the strength of evidence, F (2, 252) = 59.67, p = .001, partial "! = .32. The likelihood of
conviction mean when the evidence favored the prosecution (M = 5.20, SD =1.75) was
significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean when the evidence was
ambiguous (M = 3.54, SD =1.77), p = .001 or when the evidence favored the defense (M
= 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001. In addition, the likelihood of conviction mean when the
evidence was ambiguous was significantly higher than the likelihood of conviction mean
when the evidence favored the defense (M = 2.42, SD =1.42), p = .001. No significant
differences were found, however, for the main effect of use of a trial consultant, F (2,
252) = .40, ns, partial "! = .003 or for the interaction of use of a trial consultant and SOE,
F (4, 252) = 1.17, ns, partial "! = .01. These results support parts (a) and (b) of
Hypothesis 4, and further supports the significant main effect for SOE found in
Hypothesis 3. Table 10 presents a breakdown of the mean continuous verdict measure
scores across all conditions.

Trial Consultants

98

Table 10
Mean Continuous Verdict Measure Scores Across Conditions (N = 255)
Use of trial consultant
SOE

Prosecution

Defense

Both

Advantage defense

2.68

2.50

2.10

Ambiguous

3.54

3.55

3.53

Advantage prosecution

4.71

5.52

5.39

Because Hypothesis 4 makes a specific prediction for the effects of the use of trial
consultants on verdicts only in the ambiguous condition, a planned contrast ANOVA was
conducted using the data from those in the ambiguous condition only (n = 87). The data
was collapsed across the conditions where the defense only and both sides used a trial
consultant and compared to the condition where the prosecution alone used a trial
consultant. Results indicated no significant difference in likelihood of conviction scores
as a function of use of trial consultants in the ambiguous evidence condition, F (1, 87) =
.00, ns.
Overall, analyses found no significant interaction between SOE and balance of
trial consultants using either dichotomous or continuous verdict measures. Hypothesis 4
was therefore not supported. Results indicated that the likelihood of conviction was low
regardless of the presence or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly
favored the defense, and the likelihood of conviction was high regardless of the presence
or absence of trial consultants when the evidence strongly favored the prosecution. The
likelihood of conviction was moderate when the evidence was ambiguous. No effect was
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found to indicate that the use of a trial consultant by one or both sides impacted the
likelihood of conviction for those participants in the ambiguous condition.
Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6.

It was predicted that the relationship between

the balance of trial consultants and likelihood of conviction would be mediated by
perceptions of neutrality (Hypothesis 5) and global fairness (Hypothesis 6) in the
ambiguous evidence condition. No support was found for Hypothesis 4, which had
predicted that the use of a trial consultant by one or both sides would impact the
likelihood of conviction for those participants in the ambiguous condition. Because
results from the previous analyses indicated no support for the expected pattern of data in
the ambiguous evidence condition, no further testing was conducted.
Open-Ended Questions
Open-ended questions were used to supplement Likert-type responses throughout
the questionnaire in order to provide a greater depth of opinion. They were not used for
the purposes of hypothesis testing. The first three open-ended questions correspond to
the three items of the Relational Theory measure that comprise the subscale score for
impropriety of behavior. After asking participants to rate whether “the attorneys in this
case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper,” they were asked to provide more
information: “If you thought the attorneys did something dishonest or improper, please
explain briefly in the space below.” Of greatest interest was whether or not participants
would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly prompted to respond to the
fairness of their use during the trial. Two hundred and five of the 255 participants did not
respond (81.3%). Of the 50 participants who provided more information, 39 (78%)
mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., “I’m not too familiar with how the system
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works but I don’t think it’s fair to have a full mock trial and pick favorable jurors to
choose the verdict”). While 43.6% of the participants who responded affirmatively and
mentioned the use of a trial consultant were in the condition where the prosecution only
used a trial consultant, 38.5% were in the condition where both the prosecution and
defense used a trial consultant. Only 17.9% of participants from the condition where
only the defense used a trial consultant described the use of a trial consultant as being
dishonest or improper. Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.
In the third item to comprise the subscale score for impropriety of behavior,
participants were first asked to rate whether “The use of a trial consultant was dishonest
or improper” and then asked “If you thought the use of a trial consultant was dishonest or
improper, please explain briefly in the space below.” The comments of the 53
participants who responded to this item tended to cluster into four major categories:
concern over use of a paid survey (e.g., “A trial consultant is improper because consultant
paid people to fill out a survey”), concern over the use of the mock trial (e.g., “I thought
it was improper because the defense attorneys were getting a chance to refine their case
and arguments for a man who quite possibly could be guilty and walk free as a result of
the work of the consultant”), concern over the selection of a “favorable jury” (e.g.,
“I thought it was dishonest because the consultant chose individuals who would most
likely agree with the arguments of the prosecution and that isn’t right. The people chosen
should be neutral”), and a general sense that the use of a trial consultant was not ethical
(e.g., “They should be preparing their case based on raw data to genuinely prove Jasper’s
innocence, not asking a consultant just so that they win their case”). Twenty-six of the 53
participants (49.1%) who commented that the use of trial consultant was dishonest or
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improper were in the condition where the prosecution only used a trial consultant, 12
(22.6%) were in the condition where both the prosecution and defense used a trial
consultant, and 15 (28.3%) were in the condition where only the defense used a trial
consultant. The impact of assigned condition on the comments made will be discussed in
the next chapter.
The fourth open-ended question corresponds to the second subscale, factual
decision making, of the Relational Theory measure. This subscale was assessed by two
items (Tyler, 1989), one of which asked participants to rate whether the jury was given
all of the information needed to render a verdict. Participants were then asked to explain
briefly what information they thought was missing if they thought the jury was not given
all of the information needed to render a verdict. The purpose of this question was to
provide supplemental information regarding the SOE manipulation check. Comments
such as, “The victim couldn’t identify the attacked (sic). She picked up the man out of
the line but she couldn’t even remember the man’s eye color” and “Why was Jasper
repeatedly the only blue-eyed white man? Perhaps if there were other white, blue eyed
men in the line up, they would have a different suspect” were made by participants in the
Advantage Defense condition and supported the success of the SOE manipulation.
Participants in the Advantage Prosecution condition did not have these concerns, since
their case summary differed with regard to these facts. In another example, some
participants in the Advantage Prosecution and Ambiguous Evidence conditions expressed
frustration over the failure to obtain semen samples from the husband and/or son of the
victim. Comments such as, “The jury needed more evidence from the prosecution side
(i.e., semen samples from family members)” also supported the success of the SOE
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manipulation. Participants in the Advantage Defense condition did not have these
concerns, since their case summary reported that semen samples were obtained from the
husband and son.
The fifth open-ended question corresponds to the third subscale, lack of bias, of
the Relational Theory measure. This subscale was assessed by three items, one of which
asked participants if they thought that the legal authorities involved favored one party
over another. Participants were then asked to briefly explain why they thought the legal
authorities involved favored one party over another. Of greatest interest was whether or
not participants would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly prompted to
respond to the fairness of their use during the trial. One hundred eighty-six of the 255
participants did not respond (73.0%). Of the 69 participants who provided more
information, 9 (13.0%) mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., “the use of a mock
trial to find a favorable jury”). Four participants who responded affirmatively and
mentioned the use of a trial consultant were in the condition where the prosecution only
used a trial consultant and two were in each of the other conditions. The most universal
response (25 out of 69, or 36.2%) made reference to the opinion that the victim is often
favored over the accused in criminal cases (e.g.,“I think that the defendant is always seen
as the non-favored one” and “society thinks women are angels in such situations.” This
response occurred across all conditions, regardless of the evidence strength manipulation.
Possible reasons for this will be discussed in the next chapter.
The sixth and final open-ended question asked participants to list all pieces of
evidence or other aspects of the trial that influenced their verdict determination.
Responses to this question provided a greater depth of opinion than what could be gained
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from a Likert scale rating of guilt or innocence, particularly with regard to what specific
factors appeared to be the most influential in the decision. Also of interest was whether
participants would mention the use of a trial consultant as a factor in their verdict
determination. The responses that appeared repeatedly across all nine conditions could
be grouped into the following seven categories (listed in descending order of frequency):
semen analysis, alibi, victim ID of Jasper Brennan, ID of Jasper Brennan by other
victims, witnesses at library, use of car, and a general “lack of evidence.”
Evidence related to semen analysis was mentioned 150 times across all nine
conditions (e.g., “the semen didn’t match 100%”), Jasper Brennan’s alibi was mentioned
92 times across all nine conditions (e.g., “the fact that two witnesses saw him studying
when crime occurred”), evidence related to the rape victim’s identification of Jasper
Brennan was mentioned 92 times (e.g., “the victim was not sure it was really him”),
evidence related to the identification of Jasper Brennan by the other two rape victims
mentioned in the case study appeared 81 times (e.g., “he was identified by 2 other
women”), the witnesses at the library were mentioned 59 times (e.g., “ he had 2 witnesses
stating his presence at the library”), evidence related to the role that the car played in the
crime was mentioned 37 times across all nine conditions (e.g., “he did not have a car”),
and lack of evidence was only mentioned 29 times across all nine conditions as an aspect
of the trial that influenced verdict determination (e.g., “There’s no actual proof really”).
Only two participants in the entire sample mentioned the use of a trial consultant
as a factor in their verdict determination. One commented that, “…the prosecutors
picked the jury whose to say if they also got the witness also to be on their side,” and the
other simply mentioned “the trial consultant.” Both of these participants were in the
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condition where only the prosecution used a trial consultant and where the evidence
strength favored the prosecution. Both verdicts were not guilty. Possible reasons for the
lack of importance placed on the use of trial consultants when making verdict
determinations will be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
Discussion
This chapter discusses the results obtained in the empirical study. The purpose of
this dissertation was to fill some of the gaps in the trial consultant literature by using the
principles of procedural justice to explore what, if any, impact the use of a trial consultant
can have on the outcome of a criminal jury trial, as well as the possibility that perceptions
of fairness mediate the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and juror
verdicts in cases where the evidence is ambiguous. The findings regarding the
hypothesized relationships and questions of interest are discussed first, followed by
implications for the fields of psychology and trial consulting. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the limitations of the current study, suggestions for future research, and
concluding remarks regarding the present study.
Balance of Trial Consultants
Balance of trial consultants and neutrality. Drawing on the group-value model
(Lind & Tyler, 1988), the first hypothesis focused on whether a trial was perceived as
being more neutral if there was a balance of trial consultants during a trial. If both the
prosecution and defense used the services of a trial consultant, it was hypothesized that
there would be no violation of Tyler’s (1989) neutrality principle (notion of a level
playing field) and judgments of perceived fairness were expected to be higher than if only
one side used a trial consultant. Results indicated that there were no significant
differences in neutrality scores between participants who were told that only the plaintiff
or only the defense utilized a trial consultant and those participants told that both sides
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used a trial consultant. While Hypothesis 1 was not supported, further analyses did
reveal some interesting trends.
Because the results did approach significance (p = .06), the results were examined
more closely. While post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s HSD found no significant
differences between the three conditions, simple planned contrasts indicated a significant
difference between the neutrality score of participants when the prosecution alone used a
trial consultant when compared to the neutrality scores of participants in the other two
collapsed conditions. No significant difference was found between the neutrality score of
participants when the defense alone used a trial consultant when compared to the
neutrality scores of participants in the other two collapsed conditions. Thus, there is
some evidence to indicate that it was perceived as more fair for the defense alone to use a
trial consultant than for the prosecution alone to use a trial consultant. Perceptions of
neutrality when both sides used a trial consultant were the same as when only the defense
used a trial consultant.
Balance of trial consultants and global fairness. The second hypothesis
examined whether a trial was perceived as being higher in global fairness if there was a
balance of trial consultants during a trial. In addition to neutrality, the group-value model
(Lind & Tyler, 1988) identified two other relational concerns that dominate judgments of
procedural fairness: the trustworthiness of the authorities enacting the procedures (trust),
and information about the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition). While
numerous studies have found neutrality to be the major criterion used to assess
procedural justice (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry &
Chaney, 1981; Greenberg, 1986; Tyler, 1989), other studies have shown that these three
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relational concerns together affect procedural justice judgments (Tyler, 1994; Lind et al.,
1997). The global fairness measure is comprised of all three of the group-value model’s
relational concerns (Lind & Tyler, 1988).
Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. Results indicated that there were
significant differences in perceptions of global fairness when the prosecution, the
defense, or both used a trial consultant, although the effect size was small. More
specifically, Tukey post hoc comparisons and simple planned contrasts indicated that
perceptions of global fairness were higher when both the prosecution and defense used a
trial consultant than when only the prosecution used a trial consultant, but that
perceptions of global fairness were not significantly higher when both sides used a trial
consultant if it was the defense alone using a trial consultant. Results indicate that the
use of a trial consultant significantly impacted perceptions of global fairness only when
the prosecution alone used a trial consultant.
“Benefit of the doubt” effect. Tukey post hoc comparisons found that the mean
neutrality and global fairness scores when the defense alone used a trial consultant were
nearly identical to the mean neutrality scores when both sides used a trial consultant, and
simple planned contrasts indicated a significant difference between the neutrality and
global fairness scores of participants when the prosecution alone used a trial consultant
when compared to the global fairness scores of participants in the other two collapsed
conditions. This pattern of results could be a reflection of a “benefit of the doubt” effect,
which refers to the tendency of jurors to presuppose that the defendant is innocent until
proven guilty. The assumption of innocence is rooted in our legal system, which imposed
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a reasonable doubt standard in 1970 that declared it essential to due process and fair
treatment.
The reasonable doubt standard “is bottomed on the fundamental value
determination that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go
free” (Armour, 2008). As such, the Due Process Clause “protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged” (Armour, 2008). According to legal
scholars, mandated use of this standard in all criminal proceedings is critical to a free
society because it maintains the confidence of community members in the court’s ability
to sufficiently protect the innocent (Armour, 2008). Beyond the legal import that the
presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt standard of proof impose, the
tendency of jurors to give the defendant the benefit of the doubt is also rooted in human
nature. As one legal commentator stated, “Jurors are not legal experts…they are there as
the accused person’s peers, with comparable life experience, insight and knowledge of
human relationships…It is the duty of the jurors, above all else, to put themselves in the
shoes of the defendant” (Power, 2008). The presumption of innocence is a natural
human tendency when jurors place themselves in the shoes of the defendant and think
about how they would think, behave, or react in similar circumstances (Power, 2008).
It is possible that these legal and moral leanings are responsible for the results of
Hypotheses 1 and 2. When the playing field was equal and both sides utilized the
services of a trial consultant, the mean neutrality and global fairness scores were nearly
identical to the mean neutrality and global fairness scores of participants when the
defense alone used a trial consultant. In other words, perceptions of neutrality and global
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fairness were not affected when extra assistance was provided to the defense by a trial
consultant. Perhaps participants still thought the trial was fair because they were giving
the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. When the extra assistance was provided to the
prosecution, however, perceptions of neutrality and global fairness lowered significantly.
If participants were giving the benefit of the doubt to the defendant, it would follow that
they would think it was okay for the defense to benefit from a perceived advantage but
that it would be perceived as less fair when the prosecution was the sole beneficiary of a
perceived advantage.
Strength of Evidence
The third hypothesis predicted that jurors would be most likely to find the
defendant guilty when the evidence was in favor of the prosecution and least likely to
find the defendant guilty when the evidence favored the defense. When SOE was
ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction would fall somewhere in between. This
prediction of a main effect for SOE was based on experiments conducted in both the
laboratory and the field that have shown a strong positive association between SOE and
jury verdicts of guilt (Devine et al., 2001).
Hypothesis 3 was supported for both dichotomous and continuous verdict
measures. A logistic regression analysis using the dichotomous verdict measure
indicated a significant relationship between SOE and likelihood of conviction.
Furthermore, as predicted, the number of participants whose verdict determination was
“guilty” was highest when the evidence favored the prosecution, moderate when the
evidence was ambiguous, and lowest when the evidence favored the defense. Analysis of
variance using the continuous verdict measure found a significant relationship and large
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effect size between the verdict chosen and the strength of evidence. The strong positive
association between SOE and juror verdicts of guilt found in numerous other studies
(Devine et al., 2001) received further support from the current research.
The dichotomous verdict results of Hypothesis 3 also provide some information
that further supports the “benefit of the doubt” theory. Results from the analyses indicate
that when the evidence was clearly presented to participants as either favoring one side or
another, participants tended to provide a verdict as expected. What was not expected,
however, was the large majority of participants in the ambiguous condition who chose
“not guilty” when forced into making a decision by the dichotomous verdict option.
Twenty-two percent of the participants whose case was ambiguous chose guilty, while
78% of participants whose case was ambiguous chose not guilty. Thus, the expected
even split between guilty and non-guilty verdicts was not found for participants in the
ambiguous evidence condition who were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision.
Rather, many more participants in the ambiguous condition chose a non-guilty verdict,
indicating that the defense appears to receive the benefit of the doubt when participants
are forced to choose guilty or not guilty. This is an interesting finding, particularly in
light of the fact that if participants had only been required to make a continuous verdict
determination, this effect would have gone undetected.
The results of the first three hypotheses are similar to those reported by Stolle et
al. (1996) in their study. These researchers found a significant interaction such that when
the outcome favored the defendant, the use of a trial consultant was thought to be equally
fair whether or not the defendant had a trial consultant. When the outcome favored the
prosecution/plaintiff, however, the use of a trial consultant was thought to be more fair
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when the defendant had a trial consultant than when he did not. Taken together, this
pattern of results can be interpreted as a reflection of the philosophy of the American jury
system and its emphasis on the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt
standard. Just as the participants in this study received a Juror Instruction form prior to
coming to any conclusions regarding the facts of the case, jurors in the American legal
system are provided with instructions prior to deliberation that seek to educate them on
the fundamental principles of our law that apply in all criminal trials- the presumption of
innocence, the burden of proof, and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The pattern of results seen in the first three hypotheses could be interpreted as supporting
the successful application of these standards in a trial situation.
Interaction Between Balance of Trial Consultants and SOE
The fourth hypothesis predicted that the likelihood of conviction would be
impacted by an interaction between SOE and the balance of trial consultants. More
specifically, it was expected that when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of
conviction would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when
both sides used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant.
Research has shown that when the evidence strongly favored either the defense or the
prosecution, the bias tendencies of jurors decreased (e.g., Baumeister & Darley, 1982;
Kaplan & Miller, 1978) and jurors reached a verdict based largely on the strength of the
evidence presented during trial. When the evidence was not clear, however, it was
predicted that jurors would be more likely swayed by biasing factors, such as the
presence or absence of a trial consultant.
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Analyses using both the dichotomous and continuous verdict measures were
conducted. Hypothesis 4 was not supported. While analyses showed a significant
difference for the main effect of SOE when comparing SOE favors prosecution to the
other two conditions, no significant differences were found for the main effect of use of a
trial consultant or for the interaction of use of a trial consultant and SOE. As expected,
when SOE strongly favored the defense, the likelihood of conviction was low and when
SOE strongly favored the prosecution, the likelihood of conviction was high. However,
contrary to predictions, the balance of trial consults did not impact the likelihood of
conviction in the present study. It had been predicted that when the evidence was
ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction would be the highest when the defendant alone
used a trial consultant. In those conditions, the relational model (Tyler, 1989) would
predict that jurors would perceive the defense as having an unfair advantage and would
compensate for this by being more likely to find in favor of the prosecution. The results
of the present study indicate that participants perceived no such disadvantage.
Based on the clear “benefit of the doubt” effect found in the results of the first
three hypotheses, however, it is possible that the prediction made was incorrect. It was
originally expected that when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction
would be highest when the defense used a trial consultant, moderate when both sides
used a trial consultant, and lowest when the prosecution used a trial consultant. Using the
“benefit of the doubt” theory as a basis for prediction, however, it would be expected that
when the evidence was ambiguous, the likelihood of conviction when the defense used a
trial consultant would be fairly similar to the likelihood of conviction when both sides
used a trial consultant. Based on the pattern of findings seen thus far, no unfair
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advantage would be perceived when the defense alone used a trial consultant. When the
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, however, the “benefit of the doubt” pattern
would predict that an unfair advantage would be perceived, causing participants to be less
likely to convict the defendant than they would under normal circumstances. Thus, using
the “benefit of the doubt” theory as a basis for prediction, it would be expected that when
the evidence was ambiguous the likelihood of conviction would be lower when the
prosecution alone used a trial consultant than when the defense alone used a trial
consultant or both sides used a trial consultant.
In order to test this new prediction as guided by the “benefit of the doubt”
premise, a post hoc analysis was performed using the ambiguous condition only (n = 87)
after collapsing across the conditions where the defense only and both sides used a trial
consultant and comparing it to the condition where the prosecution only used a trial
consultant. No significant results were found. Thus, Hypothesis 4 continued to find no
support even when restricted to the ambiguous condition subsample and altered to take
into account the “benefit of the doubt” effect.
The lack of a significant interaction in Hypothesis 4 indicates that the balance of
trial consultants did not impact verdict determination in the present study. If only one
party in the trial used the services of a trial consultant, it did not have a statistically
significant impact on participants’ likelihood to convict or acquit the defendant. Results
show that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of likelihood of conviction. One
of the major purposes of this study was to explore for the first time whether the balance
of trial consultants can affect a juror’s perceptions of procedural justice and impact his or
her verdict, particularly in cases where the evidence is ambiguous. Although research
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has shown that the bias tendencies of jurors decrease when confronted with clear proof of
guilt or innocence and increase when the evidence is more ambiguous (e.g., Baumeister
& Darley, 1982; Kaplan & Miller, 1978), the results of this study do not indicate that
participants viewed the presence or absence of a trial consultant in the ambiguous
condition as an influential factor when making verdict decisions. In the current study,
use of a trial consultant did not serve as a biasing factor.
Mediation: Relationship Between Balance of Trial Consultants and Verdict
Another purpose of this study was to examine why the balance of trial
consultants, particularly in cases where the use of a trial consultant between parties was
uneven, would increase or decrease the likelihood that a juror would convict a defendant.
It was hypothesized that perceptions of neutrality and/or global fairness would mediate
the relationship between the balance of trial consultants and juror verdicts when the
evidence was ambiguous. The present study found that the balance of trial consultants
had no impact on the likelihood of conviction across any SOE conditions (Hypothesis 4).
As discussed above, results show that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of
likelihood of conviction. There was no statistically significant impact on participants’
likelihood to convict or acquit the defendant as a function of one or both sides using the
services of a trial consultant.
The failure of the trial consultant manipulation to produce a biasing effect,
particularly in the ambiguous condition, rendered the question of a mediating variable
moot. Since the balance of trial consultants did not increase or decrease the likelihood
that a juror would convict a defendant, there was no relationship for neutrality and/or
global fairness to mediate. Mediation analyses were initiated, but correlations showed
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that the use of a trial consultant was unrelated to the likelihood of conviction in the
ambiguous condition. Correlations also showed that the likelihood of conviction was
unrelated to neutrality and global fairness scores in the ambiguous condition. Perhaps if
the evidence did not strongly favor either the defense or prosecution, it was difficult for a
relationship to exist between perceptions of neutrality and/or fairness and the likelihood
of conviction. Because a precondition for finding significant mediation is that all three
correlations among the three variables must be statistically significant (Baron & Kenny,
1986), further analyses were not conducted.
Open Ended Questions
Throughout the questionnaire, open-ended questions were used to supplement
Likert-type responses. While the responses to these questions were not used for the
purposes of hypothesis testing, a closer examination of some of the informal findings
provided some interesting information that would have been impossible to detect from a
rated response. In most cases, the pattern of responses reflected the “benefit of the
doubt” effect found throughout hypotheses testing.
The first open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the
attorneys in the case had done something that was dishonest or improper. More than
three-quarters of the participants who provided more information mentioned the use of
trial consultants, although participants had not been prompted to respond to the fairness
of their use during the trial. More specifically, less than one-fifth of the participants who
described the use of a trial consultant as being dishonest or improper were from the
condition where only the defense used a trial consultant. This pattern of responses
supports the “benefit of the doubt” theory discussed earlier in this section. It is possible
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that the attorneys in the case were less likely to be perceived as acting dishonestly or
improperly when the defense alone used a trial consultant because the participants were
already giving the benefit of the doubt to the defendant. More than twice as many
participants from the condition where only the prosecution used a trial consultant as well
as more than twice as many participants from the condition where both sides used a trial
consultant described the use of a trial consultant as being dishonest or improper.
The third open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the
use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper. Four major categories emerged:
concern over the use of a paid survey, concern over the use of the mock trial, concern
over the selection of a “favorable jury,” and a general sense that the use of a trial
consultant was not moral/ethical. Based on the literature related to the field of trial
consulting that was discussed earlier, these concerns were all logical. The first three
comprise the core of the job performed by a trial consultant. The fourth is a reflection of
one of the major issues in the trial consulting industry. Responses also provided
additional support for the “benefit of the doubt” theory. Approximately half of the
participants who commented that the use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper
were in the condition where the prosecution only used a trial consultant. Once again, it
appears that it was considered less fair for the prosecution to have a perceived advantage,
so more participants in that condition viewed the use of a trial consultant as improper.
When the defense had the perceived advantage, fewer participants viewed this as
improper because the defense was arguably given the benefit of the doubt.
The fourth open-ended question asked participants to explain what information
they thought was missing if they thought the jury was not given all of the information
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needed to render a verdict. This question served two purposes: it provided supplemental
information regarding the SOE manipulation check, and it provided important
information that could be used to strengthen or weaken the SOE manipulation in future
studies. As discussed in Chapter 7, participant responses supported the success of the
SOE manipulation. The second purpose of this question was to help strengthen the SOE
manipulation in future studies. While some of the comments made by participants were
the result of a deliberate manipulation by the researcher, other responses were not and
could therefore be used to further strengthen or weaken the cases in future studies.
Participant responses that did not directly relate to an intended manipulation tended to
cluster into four categories: The lack of serology evidence from the other two rape
victims discussed in the case, an expressed wish for a phone bill or phone records to
verify Jasper’s alibi, lack of gun evidence, and lack of DNA evidence. Although DNA
evidence was not available at the time the crime in question was committed, it is
understandable that some participants would not be aware of this fact and would question
its absence in the case. Future studies may want to consider including some or all of
these factors when manipulating evidence among conditions.
The fifth open-ended question asked participants to explain why they thought the
legal authorities involved favored one party over another. Of greatest interest was
whether or not participants would mention the use of trial consultants when not directly
prompted to respond to the fairness of their use during the trial. Over one-third of the
respondents made reference to the opinion that the victim is often favored over the
accused in criminal cases. This response occurred across all conditions, regardless of the
evidence strength manipulation. Once again, these responses can be viewed as support
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for the “benefit of the doubt” theory; when the participants sensed inequity, they were
quick to blame it on a tendency to favor the victim (thus showing support for the
defense). Very few respondents mentioned the use of trial consultants (e.g., use of a
mock trial, survey, etc.) as a factor in their belief that the legal authorities involved
favored one party over another. This failure to single out the use of trial consultants as a
source of bias or unfairness during the trial should be viewed as a positive sign from the
perspective of those in the trial consulting industry. Their presence during a trial did not
appear to have a strong effect on perceptions of fairness in the present study.
Finally, the sixth open-ended question asked participants to list all pieces of
evidence or other aspects of the trial that influenced their verdict determination. The
most frequently mentioned variables were semen analysis, the alibi of the accused, the
rape victim’s identification of the accused, and evidence related to the identification of
the accused by two other rape victims. Each of these was mentioned more than 80 times.
In contrast, only two participants in the entire sample mentioned the use of a trial
consultant as a factor in their verdict determination. The failure to single out the use of
trial consultants as a contributing factor in verdict determination supports the lack of
significant findings for Hypothesis 4, which found that the balance of trial consultants did
not impact verdict determination across any SOE conditions in the present study. Results
showed that evidence strength was the strongest predictor of likelihood of conviction, and
responses to the open-ended question also show that the most frequently cited reasons for
verdict determination were evidence based.
In general, responses to the open-ended questions tended to provide further
support for the “benefit of the doubt” theory. When participants were asked to explain
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why they thought the legal authorities involved favored one party over another, more than
one third of the responses made reference to the belief that the victim is often favored
over the accused in criminal cases. Furthermore, half of the participants who commented
that the use of trial consultant was dishonest or improper were in the condition where the
prosecution only used a trial consultant. The remaining half was split almost evenly
between the condition where both the prosecution and defense used a trial consultant and
the condition where only the defense used a trial consultant. Perhaps when the defense
had the perceived advantage rather than the prosecution, fewer participants viewed this as
improper because the defense was being given the benefit of the doubt. The results from
the present study are perhaps an indication of just how deeply rooted the belief in the
presumption of innocence has become for jurors in our legal system.
Contributions to the Literature
This dissertation makes several contributions to both the procedural justice and
trial consulting literatures. Despite the prevalence of trial consultants in the American
courtroom, the role that perceptions of procedural justice play in relation to the use of
consultants is an area of critical importance that has gone largely unexplored.
Implications for the Field of Psychology. The present study offers a unique
contribution to the procedural justice literature. Because variables such as fairness are
more difficult to operationalize, quantify, or measure (Fondacaro, 1995), empirical
academic literature related to scientific trial consulting has tended to focus more on the
objective notion of efficacy (Stolle et al., 1996). The perceived fairness of trial
consulting is of vital importance, however. As researchers have pointed out, the
perception that procedures are unfair or unethical can undermine the legitimacy of our
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entire legal system (MacCoun et al., 1992). Although procedural justice has been
confirmed in a wide variety of settings including citizens’ dealings with the police (e.g.,
Tyler & Folger, 1980), political allocations (e.g., Tyler et al., 1985), interpersonal
contexts (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986), and within organizations (e.g., Greenberg,
1987; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987), there has been very limited application of its
principles to the field of trial consulting.
This dissertation expands our knowledge of procedural justice by providing one
of the only empirical studies to use Tyler and Lind’s (1992) relational model of authority
to investigate the impact that trial consulting procedures have on the perceived fairness of
courtroom proceedings and the outcomes of these proceedings. Tyler (1989) built upon
Leventhal’s (1976) framework when he identified three relational concerns that dominate
judgments of procedural fairness: the trustworthiness of the authorities enacting the
procedures (trust), the neutrality of those authorities (neutrality), and information about
the individual’s standing in the group (status recognition). As discussed earlier in this
chapter, results indicated that the balance of trial consultants did affect perceptions of
global fairness (a combination of all three relational concerns), and, to a lesser extent,
perceptions of neutrality when the prosecution alone used the services of a trial
consultant. The partial support for the main effect of trial consultants is the first time
such an effect has been found.
In the present study, results were stronger when perceptions of global fairness
were examined than when perceptions of neutrality were examined. One possible
explanation for this difference is that all three dimensions of Tyler’s (1989) relational
model are needed to fully capture perceptions of fairness. It is also possible that the
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different results found when examining neutrality and global fairness scores is a result of
participants’ failure to recognize the role played by trial consultants. In order to
investigate this possibility, all analyses were repeated using only the sample for which the
trial consultant manipulation was successful (n = 190). The results did not differ
significantly from the results obtained when using the full sample (N = 255).
The present study found marginal support for the critical importance of neutrality
as it relates to the use of trial consultants in a courtroom setting. Leventhal’s consistency
dimension (incorporated into Tyler’s concept of neutrality) has been found in a number
of studies (e.g., Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Leventhal, 1979; Fry & Chaney,
1981; Greenberg, 1986) to be the major criterion used to assess procedural justice, and
Tyler’s (1989) study showed that when the issue of concern was outcome fairness,
neutrality became the most important variable. In the present study, the use of a trial
consultant by the prosecution alone impacted both neutrality and global fairness scores.
This indicates that the dimension of neutrality is capable of affecting participants’
perceptions of fairness when isolated from trust and status recognition, although the
effect was stronger when global fairness scores were used.
In addition to applying the relational model of authority to investigate the
perceived fairness of trial consulting procedures in a courtroom setting, the present study
also examined the impact that perceptions of fairness had on the outcomes of these
proceedings. Results indicated that while the use of a trial consultant can affect
perceptions of neutrality and global fairness, no support was found for the position that
the use of trial consultants impacts the outcomes of these proceedings. Although
procedural justice in the present study was affected when the prosecution alone used a
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trial consultant, results did not show that verdict determination was affected. The strong
positive association between SOE and juror verdicts of guilt found in numerous other
studies (Devine et al., 2001) received further support from the current research.
Furthermore, in the course of investigating whether the balance of trial consultants
influenced juror verdicts when SOE was ambiguous, this study was unique in its
investigation of whether perceptions of fairness mediated this relationship. Because the
relationship between trial consultant balance and juror verdicts was untested prior to this
study, the lack of significant findings was informative.
Implications for the Field of Trial Consulting. One of the main purposes of this
dissertation was to examine whether the balance of trial consultants during a trial could
affect a juror’s perceptions of fairness. Stolle et al. (1996) and Griffith et al. (2007)
conducted the only other known studies that have attempted to link the balance of trial
consultants to measures of procedural justice, and virtually nothing is known with regard
to whether trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of bias. Stolle et al. (1996)
found a lack of significant multivariate effects for the presence of trial consultants, which
led them to suggest that “consultant presence may not affect judgments of procedural
justice at all” (p. 168). The results of the current study indicate that the use of a trial
consultant can impact perceptions of fairness under certain conditions. When the
prosecution alone used a trial consultant, it was perceived as less fair than when the
defense alone used a trial consultant or when both sides used a trial consultant. Attorneys
might want to consider the negative impact on a juror’s perceptions of fairness when
using a trial consultant if the defense is not also using the services of a trial consultant.
This finding provides support to those who advocate leveling the playing field during
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jury trials. This can be accomplished by using public funds to enable defendants to hire
trial consultants (National Jury Project, 1999). State funding of trial consultants is also a
possibility and should be considered (Barber, 1994; Stolle et al., 1996), as is encouraging
more pro bono assistance (Stewart, 2002). Lieberman and Sales (2007) suggest that, “In
addition to the financial needs of a defendant, the seriousness of charges brought against
a defendant provides a criterion that could be used for determining whether courts should
grant requests for court-appointed scientific jury selection consultants” (p. 197). This is
an interesting approach worthy of future attention.
While the importance of a balance of trial consultants between parties had been
expected, no support was found for the position that perceptions of fairness were affected
when extra assistance was provided to the defense by a trial consultant. In the current
study, the benefit of the doubt appeared to go to the defendant such that even when the
defense received a perceived advantage, participants still thought that the trial was fair.
The results of the present study suggest that while juror knowledge of the use of a trial
consultant for the defense may not have any bearing on the perceived fairness of a trial,
juror knowledge of the use of a trial consultant by the prosecution alone may affect the
perceived fairness of a trial. At the very least, the evidence suggests that in situations
where only the prosecution utilizes a trial consultant, trial consultants should follow the
recommendation made by some researchers (e.g., Griffith et al., 2007) and remain outside
the jury’s awareness. While trial consultants can assist lawyers in such matters as case
analysis, voire dire questions and presentation, surveys, witness preparation, and mock
trials without stepping foot into a courtroom, a major disadvantage of this approach is
that the consultant cannot offer his/her expertise as far as evaluating potential jurors or
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comparing in-court perceptions against the pre-trial research that has been compiled
(Bennett & Hirschhorn, 1993). Therefore, in situations where there is a balance between
trial consultants, it may still be best for the trial consultant to be present in the courtroom.
Another major purpose of the present study was to investigate whether
perceptions of fairness were partially responsible for increasing (or decreasing) the
likelihood that a juror would convict a defendant when SOE was ambiguous and the
balance of trial consultants between parties was uneven. Some researchers have warned
that the presence of trial consultants can foster the negative societal perception that the
jury system is being undermined or rigged, or that juries can be manipulated and their
actions predicted (e.g., Barber, 1994). As Posey and Wrightsman (2005) point out, the
first book that systematically examined the field of trial consulting is entitled “Stack and
Sway” (Kressel & Kressel, 2002), a title that conjures up images of influence and
manipulation. Other researchers in the field have insisted that we should not fear that
jurors will resent lawyers who have jury and trial consultants in the courtroom. Jurors
interviewed post-trial, for example, have consistently said that they felt the need to be
even more fair in looking at and verbalizing their biases and prejudices when a trial
consultant was present (Bennett and Hirschhorn, 1993). The present study failed to find
evidence supporting the position that the use of a trial consultant served as a biasing
factor by impacting the verdict determination of jurors. Although the use of a trial
consultant was found to affect perceptions of neutrality and global fairness under certain
conditions, these perceptions of fairness did not appear to translate into a bias when
determining verdicts. Results indicated that the use of a trial consultant was unrelated to
the likelihood of conviction in the ambiguous condition. Results did find a significant
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and strong association between the verdict chosen and the strength of evidence, however,
which supports the outcome found in numerous other studies (Devine et al., 2001).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
While this study made some unique and potentially important contributions to the
trial consulting and procedural justice literatures, the conclusions may be limited by
several factors. One potential limitation of this study is the reliability and validity of the
scores on the Relational Theory measure. Due to the lack of established neutrality, trust,
and status recognition scales, the questionnaire that was used to measure neutrality and
global fairness was created by combining items adapted from questionnaires used by
other researchers (e.g., Stolle et al., 1996; Tyler, 1989). Future research should replicate
this study with the new measure to provide further proof of the reliability and validity of
the scores on the items.
In the present study, a potential limitation was the low reliability observed for the
impropriety of behavior subscale of the neutrality scale. The removal of the fourth item
increased the ! reliability for the subscale to .67 (from .60), but this level is still below
the criterion of .70 that had been set for the minimally acceptable level of internal
consistency (Nunnally, 1978). In addition, removing this fourth item potentially reduced
the construct validity of the measure. Another potential limitation was that the factual
decision making subscale and the trust scale both contained only two items. While this is
not unusual with scales in the literature (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980; Tyler,
1989), it does raise concerns about subscale and scale reliability (Nunnally, 1978).
Future research should consider lengthening this subscale and scale. The reliability of the
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subscales and scales should be further developed before using them to examine
perceptions of neutrality and global fairness in future research.
In addition, although the lack of significant correlations among variables in this
study prevented mediation analyses, it should be pointed out that some researchers (e.g.,
James, Mulaik, & Brett, 1982) caution that causal inferences are weakened when using
concurrent data with mediators. Because mediation implies that the independent variable
affects the mediator and then the mediator affects the dependent variable, mediation
should not technically be performed on concurrent data. It is impossible to show that the
independent variable caused a change in the mediator rather than vice versa when the
data is collected at one time of measurement. Future studies examining the potential
mediating role of procedural justice should consider collecting longitudinal data to more
accurately determine true mediation.
This study is also potentially limited by the fact that the trial consultant
manipulation did not work for a number of participants. While the success of the trial
consultant manipulation was statistically significant, 65 participants (25%) did not
accurately identify the use of a trial consultant in the case summary. It is not clear why
this was the case. Stolle et al. (1996) did not report any problems when using the same
trial consultant manipulation in their study. Thus, it may be useful for future research to
focus on strengthening the trial consultant manipulation. Perhaps mentioning once again
the use of a trial consultant for one or both sides at the end of the case summary or
prompting participants to refer back to the case summary if they are unsure of an answer
would help to increase reporting accuracy in the future.
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Another potential limitation is the concern that the external validity of the results
may be lowered as a result of using a student sample (as opposed to a sample comprised
of real jurors) and/or a written case summary (as opposed to a more realistic simulation).
Most of the studies conducted in the legal field use simulations due to the complications
(both legally and logistically) when conducting jury research on actual cases. According
to Bornstein (1999), this practice has raised a number of ecological validity concerns with
regard to such issues as the mock juror sample (e.g., undergraduates vs. adults in the
community), the research setting (e.g., laboratory vs. courtroom), the trial medium (e.g.,
written summaries vs. realistic simulations), and the consequences associated with the
task (e.g., making a hypothetical vs. a real decision).
In order to address some of these concerns, Bornstein (1999) compared different
samples of mock jurors as well as research manipulating the medium of trial presentation.
After reviewing 26 studies that have looked at the effect of student status on mock jurors’
judgments, only five studies were found to have a main effect of sample on participants’
verdicts. Similarly, Bornstein found few differences when he looked at studies that
allowed for indirect comparison between students and nonstudents by performing
multiple experiments in which a particular finding is replicated using a different sample.
Trial medium was also examined (e.g., live trial vs. brief written summaries) and not
found to have an effect in the majority of cases, with only 3 of 11 studies exerting a main
effect on mock jurors’ verdicts. Bornstein (1999) concluded that few differences have
been found with regard to either who the mock jurors are or how the mock trial is
presented.
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Further support is provided by Zickafoose and Bornstein (1999), who conducted a
couple of experiments in order to determine the effects of comparative negligence on
damage awards. In addition to discovering that damage awards were doubly discounted
for partially negligent plaintiffs, they also found that the responses of college students did
not differ from the responses of those called for jury duty. Thus, although the choice of
sample (students) and/or medium (presenting the summary trial in written form) may
have potentially limited the external validity of the present study, there is research to
suggest that this may not have been the case.
This dissertation exposes many needed directions for future research within the
field of trial consulting. As was mentioned earlier, there is a lack of empirical research in
general regarding the usefulness of trial consultants. In addition, of the relatively small
number of studies that have been conducted to examine the efficacy of trial consultants,
the sole focus has been upon jury selection at the expense of investigating other salient
aspects of a trial consultant’s job (e.g., assisting with voire dire, opening arguments,
witness testimony for each side, closing arguments, mock trials, judge’s instructions, or
jury deliberations). A survey conducted by Posey and Wrightsman (1995) found that
only 12% of a trial consultant’s time was spent on jury selection. Future research should
begin to explore the usefulness of all aspects of a trial consultant’s job. Ideally, this
research should consist of conducting mock trials (using both civil and criminal cases)
with the participation of practicing attorneys, an actual judge, and mock jurors who
accurately resemble the characteristics of the juror pool. While conducting a study like
this would be expensive, “the cost would be trivial compared with the total amount of
money that attorneys (through their clients) spend on consultants each year in the absence
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of certainty regarding the effectiveness of this approach” (Lieberman & Sales, 2007, p.
206).
Another important focus of future research should be to examine the “benefit of
the doubt” theory more thoroughly. In the present study, a pattern emerged in many of
the findings that could be interpreted as a byproduct of our jury system’s emphasis on the
presumption of innocence and use of a reasonable doubt standard. Perceptions of
neutrality and global fairness were not affected when extra assistance was provided to the
defense by a trial consultant, but they were significantly lower when the extra assistance
was provided to the prosecution. Furthermore, when participants in the ambiguous
evidence condition were forced into a dichotomous verdict decision, many more
participants than expected chose a non-guilty verdict. This pattern should be tested
experimentally. Rather than using the “benefit of the doubt” theory to explain findings
post hoc, future studies may want to hypothesize the effect and test whether it can be
replicated in a similar study and/or whether the benefit of the doubt continues to go to the
defense when circumstances are varied (e.g., extra assistance is provided to one party in
the form of a more expensive or experienced attorney).
Future studies may also want to examine the impact that party imbalance may
have on the verdict in civil cases, including the potential to affect damage awards. For
example, in cases where the evidence is ambiguous and trial consultants are not balanced
between parties, might jurors perceive the party without the consultant as an underdog
and either exonerate the defendant (in situations where the plaintiff alone has a
consultant) or compensate the plaintiff with a conviction and the award of larger damages
(in situations where the defendant alone has a consultant)? Or will the “benefit of the
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doubt” theory apply to this situation as well, causing the plaintiff to receive less
compensation even if the defendant alone uses a trial consultant? Future research should
explore these and related possibilities.
Finally, recent research in the field of social justice has demonstrated that
procedural fairness effects are often moderated by individual differences and motivations
(De Cremer & Tyler, 2005). Given that procedural fairness conveys information relevant
to the level of inclusiveness and status that one has within the group (e.g., Tyler & Lind,
1992), it is very possible that the extent to which people attend to procedures and how
much they are affected by these procedures may depend on the degree to which they
value their inclusion and belonging in a group (e.g., De Cremer & Blader, 2006). Need
to Belong is inherently associated with fairness because of its relational implications, and
has frequently been shown to moderate people’s interest in and reactions toward
procedural fairness (De Cremer & Blader, 2006; De Cremer & Tyler, 2005).
Specifically, De Cremer and Blader’s (2006) study has shown that people with a stronger
Need to Belong are more attentive to procedural fairness information than individuals
with a weaker Need to Belong, and that these differences in belongingness needs have
effects on perceived procedural fairness. Perhaps future research should include Need to
Belong items to see if there is a difference in perceptions of fairness for individuals along
this dimension.
Conclusions
While some attention has been focused on investigating whether the procedures
used by trial consultants are ethical and/or fair, this study explored for the first time if
(and under what conditions) the use of trial consultants themselves can be perceived as
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unfair. It is unique in that it is the first to investigate whether SOE and the balance of
trial consultants can influence juror verdicts, and it is the first to use the relational model
(Tyler & Lind, 1992) in general, and the concept of neutrality (Tyler, 1989) in particular,
as a framework from which to examine this relationship. In addition to examining
whether the use of trial consultants could affect juror verdicts, an intention of this study
was to explore the intervening mechanisms behind the trial consultant - verdict link.
However, because results did not find that the balance of trial consultants affected the
proportion of guilty verdicts in a criminal trial, it was not possible to examine perceptions
of neutrality and global fairness as mediating variables.
As Stolle et al. (1996) warned, perceptions of fairness are important if our justice
system is to work properly. If the use of trial consultants is perceived as unfair or
manipulative, both the participants and observers of a trial are in danger of viewing the
entire jury system as rigged or unfair. During trials, a level playing field is created by
giving both sides the opportunity to have an attorney and by giving those attorneys equal
opportunities to present arguments and question witnesses (Tyler, 1997). This study
found that the level playing field is violated when only the prosecution has access to the
resources and skills of a professional trial consultant.
The law with regard to the use of trial consultants in the courtroom is in its
nascent stage. The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled (In re Cendant Corp.
Securities Litigation, 2003) that the work product (i.e., documents and other items, either
tangible or intangible, prepared in anticipation of litigation) of a trial consultant is
protected by the attorney work-product privilege. The court also ruled that
communications at the core of the work-product doctrine are only discoverable “on a
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showing of rare and exceptional circumstances,” such as when there is a charge of
falsified testimony. While this means that attorneys are not permitted to ask witnesses to
divulge a trial consultant’s mental impressions, opinions, legal theories, and conclusions
about the upcoming litigation, it does allow an attorney to ask witnesses whether he/she
met with a trial consultant, the date and duration of any meetings, who was present and
the purpose of the meeting(s). The degree of disclosure currently permitted highlights the
importance of investigating whether trial consultants themselves can serve as a source of
perceived bias and consequently affect the outcome of a case. This study did not find
evidence that the balance of trial consultants directly impacted verdicts. However, the
balance of trial consultants did impact perceptions of fairness under certain conditions.
Consequently, until we have a better understanding of the circumstances under which
procedural justice can impact the perceptions of jurors and the potential consequences of
these perceptions of fairness, every effort should be made to level the playing field in the
courtroom, including the playing field as it pertains to the use of trial consultants.
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Appendix A
Case Summary (Ambiguous Evidence condition)
Useful definitions:
Prosecution: the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal
proceedings in court against a person
Defense: the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was
assaulted in her home. A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home. He then forced her onto a
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her. Although the assailant then claimed he only
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store. She asked the staff there to contact the
police. Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was
collected. The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the
vaginal washings.
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant. On March 26 she again returned
to the police station to view photographs of multiple men in the hope of identifying her
attacker. After searching through all of the potential suspects, she picked out the picture
of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated that he looked like the perpetrator but that she
could not be sure. The police obtained an arrest warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore
at the University of Texas at El Paso. Jasper Brennan was arrested on March 28, 1987.
The following day, on March 29, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police
station. After all the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the
victim identified Jasper Brennan as the assailant. The police also contacted two other
women who had been attacked in a similar fashion. They both identified Brennan in the
lineup, but stated that they could not be sure. Jasper Brennan was charged with three
counts of aggravated sexual assault.
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B)
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987. When the victim of the March 24, 1987,
assault took the stand, she testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember
the structure of the assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, complexion, and the
size and shape of his hands. When asked if the perpetrator had a moustache, however,
she admitted that she did not know because it was too dark in the hallway where she was
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accosted. She also acknowledged that she did not know what color her attacker’s eyes
were since she only viewed her assailant for “a short period of time.”
Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown. Mr.
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the
crime scene. Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to
samples taken from Jasper Brennan and the victim. Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown
testified that the semen was deposited by a non-secretor- a person whose blood type
antigens are not found in other body fluids. Mr. Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan,
who is a non-secretor, was a possible contributor of the semen. Semen samples from the
victim’s husband and son were not obtained. On cross-examination, Mr. Brown
acknowledged that no sperm samples had been retrieved from the other two women
attacked in a similar fashion.
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims
who had identified Jasper Brennan. The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have
perpetrated both crimes.
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified. The defense produced two
witnesses who corroborated his alibi, which was that he was studying for an exam on the
campus of his college at the time the crime occurred around 9:00 AM. Brennan’s
girlfriend, Tracy Reynolds, testified that she had called him on the telephone at his home
less than an hour before the crime occurred and had met him shortly after 9:15AM in the
campus library. A second witness, Mark Grotty, testified that he had seen Jasper
Brennan studying in the campus library sometime before 9:00AM. Furthermore, the
defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did not have an
opportunity to commit the rape.
The jury deliberated for 6 hours before returning a verdict.
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Case Summary (Advantage Prosecution condition)
Useful definitions:
Prosecution: the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal
proceedings in court against a person
Defense: the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was
assaulted in her home. A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home. He then forced her onto a
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her. Although the assailant then claimed he only
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store. She asked the staff there to contact the
police. Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was
collected. The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the
vaginal washings.
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant. On March 26 she again returned
to the police station to view photographs of multiple men in the hope of identifying her
attacker. After searching through pictures of potential suspects, she immediately picked
out the picture of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated that he looked exactly like the
perpetrator. The police obtained an arrest warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore at the
University of Texas at El Paso. Jasper Brennan was arrested on March 28, 1987.
The following day, on March 29, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police
station. After all the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the
victim positively identified Jasper Brennan as the assailant. The police also contacted
two other women who had been attacked in a similar fashion. They both identified
Brennan in the lineup. Jasper Brennan was charged with three counts of aggravated
sexual assault.
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B)
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987. When the victim took the stand, she
testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember the structure of the
assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, eye color, complexion, and the size and
shape of his hands. She stated that although the hallway where the initial attack took
place was dark, there was ample light in the bedroom to get a good view of her attacker.
She also testified that as soon as she saw Jasper Brennan in both the photographs at the
police station and in the live lineup, she knew that he was the man who had attacked her.
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Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown. Mr.
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the
crime scene. Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to
samples taken from Jasper Brennan, the victim, the victim’s husband, and the victim’s
son. Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown testified that the semen was deposited by a nonsecretor- a person whose blood type antigens are not found in other body fluids.
Furthermore, Mr. Brown’s serology analysis concluded that a blood sample taken from
Jasper Brennan put him among just 5 percent of the population who could possibly have
been the source of the semen stains. Mr. Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan, who is a
non-secretor, was a likely contributor of the semen. The victim’s husband and son, who
are secretors, were excluded as possible contributors of the semen.
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims
who had identified Jasper Brennan. The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have
perpetrated both crimes.
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified. The defense produced one
witness who corroborated his alibi, which was that he was still sleeping in the home of
his girlfriend at the time the crime occurred around 9:00 AM. Brennan’s girlfriend,
Tracy Reynolds, testified that was with him the entire morning of March 24, 1987.
Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not have a car, he did
not have an opportunity to commit the rape. On cross-examination, however, Tracy
Reynolds admitted that she had a car that Jasper Brennan drove on occasion.
The jury deliberated for 6 hours before returning a verdict.
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Case Summary (Advantage Defense condition)
Useful definitions:
Prosecution: the State as the party that represents the victim and conducts criminal
proceedings in court against a person
Defense: the party responsible for defending the person accused of a crime
On the morning of March 24, 1987, a 45 year-old woman in El Paso, Texas, was
assaulted in her home. A man wearing a stocking mask and carrying a gun broke into the
residence and attacked the woman in the hallway of her home. He then forced her onto a
bed in a bedroom and threatened to kill her. Although the assailant then claimed he only
wanted to rob her, he fondled and raped her before fleeing out the back door.
Frozen with fear, the victim waited nearly an hour before she managed to put on her
son’s bathrobe and drive herself to a local store. She asked the staff there to contact the
police. Once the police arrived, they escorted her to the hospital where a rape kit was
collected. The examining physician found sperm present on slides prepared from the
vaginal washings.
One day after the attack, on March 25, the victim was asked to come to the police station
to help them create a composite sketch of her assailant. Almost five months later, on
August 21, she was again asked to return to the police station to view photographs of
multiple men in the hope of identifying her attacker. After searching through all of the
potential suspects, she picked out the picture of a man named Jasper Brennan and stated
that he looked like the perpetrator but that she could not be sure. Jasper Brennan was the
only blue-eyed white male in the police photographs. The police obtained an arrest
warrant for Jasper Brennan, a sophomore at the University of Texas at El Paso. Jasper
Brennan was arrested on August 22, 1987.
The following day, on August 23, 1987, the woman viewed a live lineup at the police
station. Again, Jasper Brennan was the only blue-eyed white male. In addition, he was
the only person the police had placed in both the photographs and live lineup. After all
the subjects put on a hat similar to the one worn by the perpetrator, the victim identified
Jasper Brennan as the assailant. The police also contacted two other women who had
been attacked in a similar fashion. They both identified Brennan in the lineup, but stated
that they could not be sure. Jasper Brennan was charged with three counts of aggravated
sexual assault.
(Insert applicable paragraphs here- see Appendix B)
Jasper Brennan’s trial began in November 1987. When the victim took the stand, she
testified that she was very confident in her ability to remember the structure of the
assailant’s face, his physique, body size, nose, complexion, and the size and shape of his
hands. When asked if the perpetrator had a moustache, however, she admitted that she
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did not know because it was too dark in the hallway where she was accosted. She also
acknowledged that she did not know what color her attacker’s eyes were since she only
viewed her assailant for “a short period of time.”
Aside from the victim herself, the prosecution relied on the testimony of a serologist from
the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) by the name of Norbert Brown. Mr.
Brown was the person responsible for testing the rape kit and bedding taken from the
crime scene. Mr. Brown testified that he tested the items and compared the results to
samples taken from Jasper Brennan, the victim, the victim’s husband, and the victim’s
son. Based on the evidence, Mr. Brown testified that the semen was deposited by a nonsecretor- a person whose blood type antigens are not found in other body fluids. Mr.
Brown concluded that Jasper Brennan, who is a non-secretor, was a possible contributor
of the semen. The victim’s husband and son were also found to be non-secretors, and
thus could not be excluded as potential contributors of the semen.
The prosecution was permitted to introduce the testimony of one of the other rape victims
who had identified Jasper Brennan. The crimes were similar and distinctive enough in
nature for the prosecution to argue that the same man- Jasper Brennan- must have
perpetrated both crimes.
The defense claimed that Jasper Brennan was misidentified. Norbert Brown was called
to testify again, and this time admitted that forensic tests had shown that all other trace
evidence analysis found at the crime scene, including pubic hairs, excluded Jasper
Brennan as a source. The defense produced two witnesses who corroborated his alibi,
which was that he was studying for an exam on the campus of his college at the time the
crime occurred around 9:00 AM. Brennan’s girlfriend, Tracy Reynolds, testified that she
had called him on the telephone at his home less than an hour before the crime occurred
and had met him shortly after 9:15AM in the campus library. A second witness, Mark
Grotty, testified that he had seen Jasper Brennan studying in the campus library sometime
before 9:00AM. Furthermore, the defense also argued that since Jasper Brennan did not
have a car, he did not have an opportunity to commit the rape.
The jury deliberated for 6 hours before returning a verdict.
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Appendix B
Inserted Paragraphs7
For conditions where there was no TC for prosecution and there was a TC for defense
the following paragraph was inserted:
The defense hired a consultant to help with jury selection and case presentation. The
consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey to citizens living in the
jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the survey. From the survey
results the defense’s consultant found several facts which people reading this case
considered most important, and he determined which personal characteristics are highly
correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the arguments of the defense.
The consultant then informed the defense attorneys of this information, and the defense
attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy and in questioning and
selecting a favorable jury. Next, the consultant conducted a mock trial. This consisted of
a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which the attorneys for the
defense were given an opportunity to practice and refine their opening and closing
arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury deliberations. As a result of
feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial, the defense attorneys were
able to refine their case before the real trial actually began. During the trial, the
consultant sat with the defense attorneys to provide further assistance if needed.

7

Some of the details of these paragraphs have been taken from Stolle et al. (1996)
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For conditions where there was a TC for prosecution and there was no TC for defense
the following paragraph was inserted:

The prosecution hired a consultant to help with jury selection and case presentation. The
consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey to citizens living in the
jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the survey. From the survey
results the prosecution’s consultant found several facts which people reading this case
considered most important, and he determined which personal characteristics are highly
correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the arguments of the prosecution.
The consultant then informed the prosecution’s attorneys of this information, and the
prosecution attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy and in questioning
and selecting a favorable jury. Next, the consultant conducted a mock trial. This
consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which the
attorneys for the prosecution were given an opportunity to practice and refine their
opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury
deliberations. As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial,
the prosecution attorneys were able to refine their case before the real trial actually
began. During the trial, the consultant sat with the prosecution attorneys to provide
further assistance if needed.
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For conditions where there was a TC for defense and a TC for prosecution the following
paragraph was inserted:
Both the defense and prosecution hired consultants to help with jury selection and case
presentation. The defense’s consultant approached the case by first distributing a survey
to citizens living in the jurisdiction of the crime, and paid the citizens to complete the
survey. From the survey results the defense’s consultant found several facts which
people reading this case considered most important, and he determined which personal
characteristics are highly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the
arguments of the defense. The consultant then informed the defense attorneys of this
information, and the defense attorneys used this information in planning a case strategy
and in questioning and selecting a favorable jury. Next, the consultant conducted a mock
trial. This consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using mock jurors during which
the attorneys for the defense were given an opportunity to practice and refine their
opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and listen in on jury
deliberations. As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors during the mock trial,
the defense attorneys were able to refine their case before the real trial actually began.
The prosecution’s consultant used a similar approach as the defense’s consultant,
whereby he paid citizens living in the jurisdiction of the crime to complete a survey. The
survey results allowed the prosecution’s consultant to find several facts which people
reading this case considered most important, and he determined which personal
characteristics are highly correlated with an individual’s likelihood to agree with the
arguments of the prosecution. The consultant then informed the prosecution attorneys of
this information, and the prosecution attorneys used this information in planning a case
strategy and in questioning and selecting a favorable jury. The prosecution’s consultant
also conducted a mock trial, which consisted of a full dress rehearsal of the case using
mock jurors during which the attorneys for the prosecution were given an opportunity to
practice and refine their opening and closing arguments, prepare witnesses for trial, and
listen in on jury deliberations. As a result of feedback provided by the mock jurors
during the mock trial, the prosecution attorneys were able to refine their case before the
real trial actually began. During the trial, the prosecution’s consultant sat with the
prosecution attorneys and the defense’s consultant sat with the defense attorneys to
provide further assistance if needed.
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Appendix C
Juror Instructions8
We now turn to the fundamental principles of our law that apply in all criminal trials- the
presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Throughout these proceedings, the defendant is presumed to be
innocent. As a result, you must find the defendant not guilty, unless, on the evidence
presented at this trial, you conclude that the People have proven the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In determining whether the People have satisfied their burden of proving the defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider all the evidence presented, whether by
the People or by the defendant. In doing so, however, remember that, even though the
defendant introduced evidence, the burden of proof remains on the People.
The defendant is not required to prove that he/she is not guilty. In fact, the defendant is
not required to prove or disprove anything. To the contrary, the People have the burden
of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That means, before you can
find the defendant guilty of a crime, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every element of the crime including that the defendant is the person who committed that
crime. The burden of proof never shifts from the People to the defendant. If the People
fail to satisfy their burden of proof, you must find the defendant not guilty. If the People
satisfy their burden of proof, you must find the defendant guilty.
What does our law mean when it requires proof of guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt”?
The law uses the term, “proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” to tell you how convincing the
evidence of guilt must be to permit a verdict of guilty. The law recognizes that, in
dealing with human affairs, there are very few things in this world that we know with
absolute certainty. Therefore, the law does not require the People to prove a defendant
guilty beyond all possible doubt. On the other hand, it is not sufficient to prove that the
defendant is probably guilty. In a criminal case, the proof of guilt must be stronger than
that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.
A reasonable doubt is an honest doubt of the defendant’s guilty for which a reason exists
based upon the nature and quality of the evidence. It is an actual doubt, not an imaginary
doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable person, acting in a matter of this importance, would
be likely to entertain because of the evidence that was presented or because of the lack of
convincing evidence.

8

Taken from http:///www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/cjigc.html#PRESUMPTION
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Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you so firmly convinced of
the defendant’s guilt that you have no reasonable doubt of the existence of any element of
the crime or of the defendant’s identity as the person who committed the crime.
In determining whether or not the People have proven the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, you should be guided solely by a full and fair evaluation of the
evidence. After carefully evaluating the evidence, each of you must decide whether or
not that evidence convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.
Whatever your verdict may be, it must not rest upon baseless speculations. Nor may it be
influenced in any way by bias, prejudice, sympathy, or by a desire to bring an end to your
deliberations or to avoid an unpleasant duty.
If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a
charged crime, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime. If you are convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of a charged crime, you must find
the defendant guilty of that crime.
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Appendix D
Relational Theory Measure
The following scale was used for all items:
strongly
agree

moderately
agree

slightly
agree

neutral

slightly moderately strongly
disagree
disagree disagree

Neutrality Items
1.
2.
3.
4.

Impropriety of behavior:
The attorneys in this case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper.
The witnesses in this case acted in a manner that was dishonest or improper.
The use of a trial consultant was dishonest or improper.
The procedures followed in this case are similar to those followed in most other
cases. (reverse-scored)

Factual decision making:
5. The jury was given all of the information needed to render a verdict. (reversescored)
6. The jurors in this case received and understood the information needed to make a
good decision. (reverse-scored)
Lack of bias:
7. The treatment of the prosecution or defense was influenced by the characteristics
(sex, race, age, education, income, status) of the parties in the case.
8. The outcome of the trial will be influenced by the characteristics (sex, race, age,
education, income, status) of the parties in the case.
9. The legal authorities involved favored one party over another
Trust Items
10. The jury system tried to be fair to Jasper Brennan.
11. The jury system treated Jasper Brennan in a reasonable manner.
Status Recognition Items
12. Jasper Brennan was treated politely in this case.
13. Jasper Brennan was treated with respect in this case.
14. Jasper Brennan was treated with dignity in this case.
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Appendix E
Likelihood of Conviction Measure:
Verdict Determinations and Manipulation Check Items
1. a) What would your verdict be if you were a juror in this case? (please circle
one)
Not Guilty

Guilty

2. Rate the guilt of Jasper Brennan on a scale from 1 to 7 using the following
guidelines: (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)
1= I am positive Brennan is not guilty
2= I think Brennan is not guilty, but I have some doubt
3= I think Brennan is not guilty, but I have a lot of doubt
4= I can not decide if Brennan is guilty or not guilty
5= I think Brennan is guilty, but I have a lot of doubt
6= I think Brennan is guilty, but I have some doubt
7= I am positive Brennan is guilty
3. In the space below, please list all pieces of evidence or other aspects of the trial
that influenced your decision.

4. If you circled “Guilty” to Question 1, please continue. Otherwise, please skip this
question and go to Question 5.
What would be your recommended prison term for Jasper Brennan? (Please circle
the appropriate number, keeping in mind that 5 years is generally the minimum
sentence in sexual assault cases)
5 years
6 years
7 years
8 years

9 years
10 years
11 years
12 years

13 years
14 years
15 years
16 years

17 years
18 years
19 years
20 years
>20 years
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5. Rate the strength of the prosecution’s evidence (taking into account such factors
as factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 to 7 using the
following guidelines: (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)
1= The prosecution’s evidence was very weak
2= The prosecution’s evidence was moderately weak
3= The prosecution’s evidence was slightly weak
4= The prosecution’s evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally)
5= The prosecution’s evidence was slightly strong
6= The prosecution’s evidence was moderately strong
7= The prosecution’s evidence was very strong
6. Rate the strength of the defense’s evidence (taking into account such factors as
factual presentation and witness credibility) on a scale from 1 to 7 using the
following guidelines: (Please circle the number that best describes how you feel)
1= The defense’s evidence was very weak
2= The defense’s evidence was moderately weak
3= The defense’s evidence was slightly weak
4= The defense’s evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally)
5= The defense’s evidence was slightly strong
6= The defense’s evidence was moderately strong
7= The defense’s evidence was very strong
7. Rate the strength of the evidence presented in the trial:
1= The evidence strongly favored the defense
2= The evidence favored the defense
3= The evidence slightly favored the defense
4= The evidence was inconclusive (favored both parties equally)
5= The evidence slightly favored the prosecution
6= The evidence favored the prosecution
7= The evidence strongly favored the prosecution
8. In this trial, which party received assistance from a trial consultant? (Please circle
the number that best describes your memory)
1= Prosecution
2= Defense
3= Both prosecution and defense
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Appendix F
Demographic and Background Information
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability. Do NOT put your name
on this questionnaire.
1. Age

___________

2. Gender

___________

3. Ethnic origin (please circle)

White/Caucasian
Black/African American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian American/Asian
Native American
Other
Prefer Not To Answer

4. Have you ever been the victim of a violent crime?
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below.
5. Has anyone you are close to ever been the victim of a violent crime?
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below.
6. Have you ever been accused of a violent crime?
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below.
7. Has anyone you are close to ever been accused of a violent crime?
If yes, please describe briefly in the space below.
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